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Abstract 
Significant positive and negative consequences across the entire spectrum of 
issues are expected from the much debated Transatlantic Trade and Investment 
Partnership (TTIP). This study investigates thoroughly the potential consequences 
for the education sector based on primary sources of the EU’s objectives and 
reflections for the TTIP negotiations. It approaches the possible consequences 
from the perspective of normative legitimacy and in particular how accountability 
standards differ significantly between the public and private sectors. In the 
education case the different accountability standards have critical implications for 
the universal provision of quality education. The study shows that at this still 
rather early stage of the negotiations on services in TTIP the EU generally 
continues the approach adopted since the General Agreement on Trade in Services 
(GATS) with the inclusion of privately funded education services. This causes 
uncertainty as to how the concepts of respectively public and private education 
will be interpreted with potentially critical consequences of gradual but constantly 
increasing levels of marketisation and privatisation. Ultimately, the very public 
nature of education could be at stake. Importantly, the new disciplines and rules 
intended to be included in TTIP will considerably deepen and extend the scope of 
how education may be impacted via its possible inclusion in TTIP.  
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1 The Tension between Public 
Services and International Trade  
1.1 Introduction 
The European Union (EU) and the United States (US) are currently negotiating 
the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP). The negotiations were 
launched in June 2013 and seven rounds of negotiations have taken place since 
then (European Commission - SPEECH/13/544, DG Trade, EU-US trade – 7th 
round of talks on transatlantic trade pact ends in the US). Nevertheless, it is 
believed that there is considerable way to go before an eventual agreement can be 
reached. Unlike other trade agreements the EU is negotiating or has negotiated in 
the past, TTIP has been followed with particular strong public interest. Partly, the 
interest can be explained by the size of such a trade agreement. If concluded TTIP 
would cover around 30% of global trade and become the world’s largest free trade 
area. In contrast to other free trade agreements (FTAs), TTIP aims at establishing 
new rules, standards and procedures in manifold areas. While the political elite 
argues that TTIP will bring growth and jobs, a broad range of critical voices have 
raised a number of concerns. In the European context, in particular the concerns 
of consumer interest groups have been discussed. These concerns focus on the 
agricultural sector and the risk that for example hormone-treated beef or chlorine-
washed chicken from the US could enter the European market (DG Trade, About 
TTIP, The Transatlantic Colossus 2014:44). However, it should be noted that 
TTIP is not the first attempt to build a Transatlantic Free Trade Area (TAFTA). 
Since the early 1990s, the EU and the US have initiated a number of initiatives 
with the aim of institutionalising cooperative economic and trade relations in a 
bilateral setting, e.g. the Transatlantic Partnership (TAP), the Transatlantic 
Business Dialogue (TABD), and the New Transatlantic Agenda (NTA) (Fogarty 
in Eds. Aggarwai – Fogarty 2004:180). Despite the previous failures to establish a 
Transatlantic Free Trade Area, the current TTIP negotiations are aiming towards 
this end.    
 
TTIP is characterised by the very broad range of issues that potentially are 
affected in such a wide-ranging trade and investment deal. Based on its 
unprecedented character and its likely immense consequences, there are very good 
reasons to investigate the consequences of a possible TTIP agreement. Services 
are one of the core issues, which TTIP is to include. The rationale of including 
services is that they make up a large and increasing part of advanced economies 
like the US and EU, but also because tariff rates and quotas on goods are already 
  3 
fairly low between the EU and the US (CEPR 2013:14-15, Social Europe 
Journal). International trade agreements are controversial in regard to public 
services because trade agreements reduce the policy space to regulate public 
services. The aim of trade agreements to reach growing levels of liberalisation and 
market access tends to increase the commercialisation of public services and lock-
in liberalisation measures taken at national level (Krajewski 2011:4).  In 
particular, the inclusion of services like education and health is very controversial 
based on the broader societal implications of these services. These sectors are so-
called sensitive areas” in international trade (Adlung – Mattoo in Mattoo et al. 
2008:74). The sensitivity of education can easily be explained by the crucial role 
it plays in fostering personal and social development as well as reducing 
inequality. In addition, there is also an economic argument of education. As a 
result education has so far been one of the least-covered sectors in trade 
agreements because of legitimate concerns about how legally binding trade rules 
can restrict the ability of governments to ensure access to quality education. The 
special role of education as a public good and a human right makes education 
contentious in the context of trade agreements.  
 
This study will examine the area of education primarily from a European 
perspective. As mentioned above education is a sensitive sector in the context of 
trade negotiations. In the European context, it is central that education is the 
exclusive competence of the Member States, while trade negotiations are 
conducted by the European Commission (EC) and agreed upon by unanimity in 
the Council of Ministers by the Member States. The US’ chief negotiator, Dan 
Mullaney, stated clearly at the chief negotiators' briefing during the fourth round 
of negotiations that the US aims to include education into the scope of the 
agreement. Furthermore, education may also be impacted more indirectly, e.g. 
through investor-state arbitration or regulatory cooperation.  
 
The study’s objective is to have a close examination into the relations between 
public services and the EU’s “new generation” FTAs, which were outlined in the 
Global Europe Strategy (Global Europe: Competing in the World). It that strategy 
it is pointed out that the EU’s new FTAs “need to be comprehensive and 
ambitious in coverage, aiming at the highest possible degree of trade 
liberalisation including far-reaching liberalisation of services and investment. A 
new, ambitious model EU investment agreement should be developed in close 
cooperation with Member States” (Global Europe: Competing in the World 
2006:9). In order to approach this objective this thesis is based on a case study on 
education and consequently it will focus thoroughly on the special characteristics 
of the education sector. In addition, education is an interesting case because it 
predominantly contains both public and private elements in terms of its provision 
and financing, and these elements are not easily separated. For example, some 
private education institutions are highly subsidised and their services are therefore 
similar to the ones offered by the public sector, while other private education 
institutions offer services at market conditions (WTO Education Services 
Background Note S/C/W/49 1998: 4). In addition, recent domestic reforms 
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implemented in a number of countries add to the complexity of public and private 
funding and provision (Scherrer 2005:504-505). In other words, the line between 
public and private education is inherently a blurred one. 
1.2 Research Question 
This study will examine the field of tension between on the one hand the state’s 
role of providing essential public services to its citizens and on the other hand the 
trend of globalisation to gradually open up to international trade, even in such 
areas that involve the state’s regulatory competences and which constitute central 
elements of its welfare regime.  
 
The tension described above is approached through a case study on the 
education sector. Education is chosen because this sector until recently has been 
one of the least covered sectors in trade agreements. This situation can be 
explained by concerns that the opening of education to trade would restrict the 
ability of governments to ensure universal access to quality education under 
legally binding trade rules. Education is recognised to play a crucial role for 
fostering personal and social development as well as reducing inequality. In 
addition, there is the economic argument of ensuring quality education. Education 
as a competitiveness tool is clearly visible in the Europe 2020 (Europe 2020), the 
EU’s growth strategy.   
 
Therefore, the fact that education is subject to discussion in the TTIP 
negotiations, trigger the interest in what consequences this inclusion can result in. 
Therefore the following research question will inform the study:   
1. In the case that education will be included into the scope of the “new 
generation” free trade agreements, such as TTIP, what possible consequences 
can be expected and what will it imply from a normative standpoint? 
1.3 Methodological Considerations 
This section will discuss the main methodological considerations involved in the 
present thesis. The objective is to address the possible problems that may arise 
from the research design rather than a general discussion of methodology. 
 
This study has adopted the single case study approach with the aim of 
studying in depth the education sector and the possible consequences of including 
the education sector into TTIP. The clear advantage of the case study is that it 
allows for a high degree of explanatory richness, which concerns well-defined 
types or subtypes of cases (George - Bennett 2005:31-32). Applied to this case 
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study the objective is to study comprehensively the potential consequences of 
including education into TTIP. The purpose of using the concept of “new 
generation” FTAs is that FTAs currently being negotiated share similar elements, 
and as result this analysis can be useful in accessing the impact on the education 
in those similar FTAs, which also include the education sector. Nevertheless, one 
should of course be vigilant to potential differences between these “new 
generation” FTAs. The case study design facilities the knowledge of whether and 
how a variable matters, however it is much weaker when it comes to how much a 
variable affected the issue in question (George - Bennett 2005:25). Accordingly, 
this study does not attempt to measure in any quantitative sense how much TTIP 
could influence education, but will merely focus on how TTIP could possible 
affect education. It analyses the consequences by studying how trade rules may 
challenge the public education sector. The lock-in effect, the treatment of 
subsidies and the regulatory disciplines are of particular importance. The fact that 
the TTIP negotiations are still at a rather early stage will also mean that this study 
must assess the possible consequences in a cautious manner.  
 
The sources used for this thesis is based on primary and secondary sources. 
The primary sources studied are mainly based on EC documents dealing with the 
TTIP negotiations. This study does not incorporate any primary sources from the 
Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR), which could result in a 
European bias of the study. This choice was mainly based on the availability of 
relevant documents and not as such as an intended bias towards EC primary 
sources. Part of the explanation for the lack of USTR sources can possibly be 
explained by the fact that the US actually is a federal state and as a result has a 
more homogeneous approach to handling secret trade negotiating documents. In 
contrast, the EU does not have a homogeneous approach as the level of 
transparency differs between the different traditions that exist in the different 
Member States and this can explain why documents are more likely to circulate 
than in the US. Due to the relatively early stage of the TTIP negotiations and the 
secrecy of the negotiations, it was necessary to go beyond the officially published 
documents available at DG Trade’s homepage concerning TTIP, which mainly 
serve the purpose of explaining the benefits of TTIP. Therefore, in order to be 
able to access the possible consequences of a possible TTIP agreement in the area 
of education this study has examined a number of leaked or otherwise not 
officially available documents of relevance. It can be argued that it is not the ideal 
solution to use these “not-officially published” documents, e.g. these document 
may have been revised since and therefore not the most recent edition. 
Nevertheless, in the context of the secrecy of the negotiations and the resulting 
lack of officially published documents, documents not officially published may 
provide important insights into the work in progress of the TTIP negotiations and 
therefore these documents are the best possible existing alternative to approach 
this study. In addition, this study benefits from the expert interview conducted 
with David Robinson, EI senior advisor on trade. This interview is a semi-
structured focusing on the similarities and differences between the approaches in 
GATS and TTIP and the possible consequences for the education sector.          
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1.4 Outline Section  
The thesis is structured as follows. In chapter 2 the background to the General 
Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) will be provided in order to explain the 
fundamental concepts, which are replicated in other trade agreements including 
TTIP. Chapter 3 addresses the question of normative standards of legitimacy and 
how accountability standards differ between the public and private sector, which 
is employed as the theoretical framework. Chapter 4 discusses the special role and 
function of education as well as the level of educational spending and the 
distribution between public and private spending. In chapter 5 the case study of 
the potential consequences of including education in TTIP is analysed. In the final 
chapter the results of the analysis is summarised and discussed in chapter 6.  
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2 Background  
2.1 GATS and Education  
This chapter will describe the main concepts of the General Agreement on Trade 
in Services (GATS) as well as the context of its creation. The purpose is to allow 
for a basic understanding of the fundamental concepts of GATS, which is the 
foundation of other trade agreement including TTIP. The context resulting in the 
formation of GATS is similarly significant. In particular, it is important to pay 
attention to the assumptions surrounding the benefits of liberalisations and how 
these assumptions play out when services are delivered by the public sector.  
 
Services were included in the multilateral trade architecture of the WTO in the 
GATS based on the perception that further liberalisation in services was needed 
due to the increasing share of services in international trade. It is based on the 
assumption that liberalisation will result in lower prices, improved quality and 
greater variety through economies of scale. This is largely based on the economics 
for goods trade. However, trade in services differs in some critical aspects from 
goods trade. Goods trade focuses on tariff reductions, but this is not a significant 
issue in the case of trade in services as tariffs are quite rare. Moreover, unlike 
trade in goods, cross-border trade in not the principal means of operation in 
international trade in services. From the perspective of trade in services barriers to 
trade result from so-called non-tariff barriers (NTBs). NTBs are domestic 
regulations that tend to favour local producers over foreign producers or which 
restrict or raise the cost of access to domestic markets by foreigners (Copeland - 
Mattoo in Mattoo et al. 2008:84, 103, 127). More importantly, regulations 
established by governments serve the purpose of responding to market failures 
e.g. asymmetrical information and to achieve public policy goals, e.g. provision of 
universal quality education. In the education sector such market failures derives 
principally from problems of asymmetrical information, in particular the lack of 
transparency regarding the quality of the education in question. An individual will 
only partially be able to access the quality of a particular education offer or 
institution. As a result liberalisation of trade in services involves critical trade-
offs.  
 
Furthermore, services are often provided by the public sector. The 
liberalisation logic does not take into account the situation when services are 
provided by the public sector. In this case pre-liberalisation prices are rarely 
determined by the market but are set administratively. Accordingly, seen from a 
market perspective the prices are therefore “artificially low” (Mattoo - Stern in 
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Mattoo et al. 2008:3,6,9,16). It is therefore realistic to anticipate that the price 
paid for services will not decline, but instead rise due to the different logics at 
play in the pre- and post-liberalisation circumstances. In addition, the availability 
might also declines because private actors will focus on the most profitable 
market segments, the so-called “cream-skimming” and consequently disregard 
universal access. The market approach will accordingly result in market failures.   
 
In GATS there is no definition of what is to be covered under the term 
“services”, instead GATS contains an open-ended classification of services 
involving 12 categories. Education services are included as the fifth category and 
the classification is open-ended as the twelfth category reads, “other services not 
elsewhere included”. The approach adopted in GATS takes on an unusually wide 
view of trade compared with the conventional definition of trade. Trade in 
services goes beyond the traditional cross-border exchange and involves 
consumer movements and factor flows i.e. investment and labour. In addition, the 
scope of disciplines exceeds the treatment of products (services) to cover 
measures affecting service suppliers (producers, traders and distributors)   (Mattoo 
- Stern in Mattoo et al. 2008:5, Adlung - Mattoo in Mattoo et al. 2008: 48-50). 
This enlarged approach is defined in GATS article I:2 that includes four modes of 
supply:  
 Cross-border (mode 1) – i.e. services supplied from the territory of one 
country into the territory of another e.g. distance education.  
 Consumption abroad (mode 2) – i.e. services supplied in the territory of 
one country to the consumers of another e.g. students attending school in 
another country or studying abroad.  
 Commercial presence (mode 3) – i.e. services supplied through any type of 
business or professional establishment of one country in the territory of 
another e.g. foreign education providers local branch campuses, 
subsidiaries or franchises of courses or programmes in local markets.   
 Presence of natural persons (mode 4) – i.e. services supplied by either 
employed or self-employed nationals of one country in the territory of 
another e.g. foreign teachers.  
 
GATS article I:3(a) lies down the scope of the measures affecting trade in services 
to cover all levels of government and public authority in addition to non-
governmental bodies in the exercise of delegated powers such as government-
mandated regulators or licensing bodies (article I GATS). In GATS article 
XXVII(a) the comprehensiveness is spelt out by explicitly stating that the measure 
could essentially take any form “whether in the form of a law, regulation, rule, 
procedure, decision, administrative action, or any other form” (article XXVII(a) 
GATS). It is noteworthy because it renders the scope so wide that no measures are 
excluded. As mentioned above even measures adopted by non-governmental 
bodies are included into the scope of GATS, and accordingly measures by school 
boards would also be covered (Colas-Gottlieb 2011:9).  
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Additionally, GATS VI:4 includes the possibility to set up disciplines in order 
to ensure that qualification requirements and procedures, technical standards and 
licensing requirement do not to constitute “unnecessary barriers to trade in 
services” (GATS VI:4). In particular, this means that measures must not be “more 
burdensome than necessary to ensure the quality of the service” (GATS VI:4b). 
Concerning future disciplines under GATS article VI:4, Adlung and Mattoo 
mention that the discussions have focused on four key concepts.  
The first concept resembles the concept just referred above in that it requires the 
“necessity in view of a specific legitimate objective” (Adlung - Mattoo in Mattoo 
et al. 2008:67). As a result, it is not sufficient that measures are established to 
achieve a specific legitimate objective, but these measures must not be more trade 
restrictive than necessary and must be necessary for fulfilling the specific public 
policy objective. WTO panels considering article XX on General Exemptions of 
GATT have applied a particularly high standard for the meaning of “necessary”. 
Accordingly, it must be shown that “there were no alternative measures 
consistent with the General Agreement or less inconsistent with it”, (Thailand – 
Restrictions on Importation of and Internal Taxes on Cigarettes, DS 10/R-
37S/200:§ 75).  
 
Furthermore, the concept of ‘affecting trade in services’ (article I:1) 
considerably broadens the scope, e.g. even if a certain measure is  principally 
aimed at product trade this nevertheless does not prevent it from also affecting 
trade in services (Adlung - Mattoo in Mattoo et al. 2008:51). In relation to 
requirements of qualification requirements, licensing and accreditation in the 
education sector the issue at stake is how to decide or if necessary to demonstrate 
that measures do not breach the principal of being more burdensome than 
necessary. It is a difficult task to prove that a particular measure is necessary and 
that no other less interfering measure could have been introduced instead. 
Moreover, it must be assumed to require considerable resources. Regulations in 
general, but standards and rules in the education sector are designed through 
compromises based on democratic decision-making rather than to meet the 
requirement to be the least burdensome. More generally, as argued by Scherrer, 
the simple anti-discrimination rule of GATS infringes severely into the state’s 
regulations designed to achieve those societal goals that goes beyond merely 
hindering or facilitating cross-border economic activities. Those regulations are 
put in place with the aim of guaranteeing that basic services are provided 
nationwide, are universally accessible and that quality standards are maintained 
(Scherrer 2005: 489).  
 
Despite this broad scope outlined above GATS includes a certain degree of 
counterbalance through the exemption of governmental authority. GATS article 
I.3 exclude “services supplied in the exercise of governmental authority”, which 
is defined as a service “supplied neither on a commercial basis, nor in 
competition with one or more service suppliers” (GATS art I.3). It is nevertheless 
not evident what is included in the exemption due to the absence of common 
definitions of the key concepts in the definition. Particularly, the lack of definition 
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of “commercial basis” and  “in competition” is problematic. The WTO Secretariat 
background note on education services, despite not directly discussing the 
application of the exemption of governmental authority, it states that “Basic 
education provided by the government may be considered to fall within the 
domain of, in the terminology of GATS, services supplied in the exercise of 
governmental authority (supplied neither on a commercial basis nor in 
competition).” (WTO Education Services Background Note S/C/W/49 1998:4).  
 
As emphasised by David Robinson, EI (Education International) senior 
advisor on trade, the above quote is significant in not denying that basic education 
i.e. primary and secondary education may not fall within the exemption depending 
on the degree of private sector involvement and competition in the education 
system (interview with David Robinson). Consequently, the ambiguity of the 
exemption to education is apparent. Similarly, Adlung and Mattoo on the one 
hand assess that primary education is covered by the GATS exemption, but on the 
other hand they acknowledge that it is uncertain whether the exemption applies 
when services are not provided for free, but for a certain fee or charge (Adlung - 
Mattoo in Mattoo et al. 2008:52). Moreover, in the legal opinion on GATS impact 
on education in Canada, Colas and Gottlieb point out that while GATS does not 
contain any definitions of the terms “commercial basis” and “competition”, they 
are of the opinion that a public university would be likely to be considered as 
providing service on a “commercial basis” or to be in “competition” with other 
education service providers and therefore not covered by the GATS exemption.  
 
Due to the lack of definitions of the concepts “commercial basis” and “in 
competition”, treaty interpretation rules, in particular article 31(1) of the Vienna 
Convention (Vienna Convention on the law of the treaties, article 31(1)), requires 
that the concepts are given their ordinary meaning in their context and in light and 
of their object and purpose. In the context of GATS it will imply a narrow 
interpretation of the concepts as GATS seeks to reach progressively “higher levels 
of liberalisations of trade in services”. (Colas - Gottlieb 2011:3,10,13). 
Consequently, due to the lack of common definitions of the GATS exemption of 
governmental authority, Robertson et al. question its utility for the education 
sector, as it is uncertain if there remain any education systems that fulfil the 
conditions (Robertson et al. in Lauder et al. 2006:234-235). Rather, the education 
systems of most countries are mixed systems, where the private sector plays a role 
(to different degrees) and this role is in competition with the public sector.  
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3 Theoretical Framework   
This chapter takes the global governance literature as the point of departure. 
Global governance explores how to make sense of accountability arrangements in 
the global context. For the purpose of the present study the global governance 
literature focusing especially on public-private partnerships (PPPs) is particularly 
relevant in approaching the inquiry into the diffuse boundaries between public and 
private education. The concept of PPPs is rather ambiguous and there is no 
commonly agreed definition. Schäferhoff et al. define PPPs as “institutionalized 
transboundary interactions between public and private actors, which aim at the 
provision of public goods” (Schäferhoff et al., 2009:455, Bäckstrand in Eds. 
Bexell - Mörth 2010:147). The category of “private actors” in the definition is 
broad in scope and can denote everything from multinational companies to civil 
society organisations. Even so, in line with the purpose of this study “private 
actors” will be understood in the narrow sense of private companies. Remarkably, 
PPPs aiming to tackle public policy issues are mutual initiatives that have the 
effect of increasing the political authority of the private actors involved. This 
raises the question if and to what extent market sphere norms and public sphere 
norms come into conflict with each other in such joint configurations (Bexell - 
Mörth in Eds. Bexell - Mörth 2010:9). Even if the field of study is not a PPP, the 
PPP literature engages in the questions of the tension between public and private 
spheres from a normative point of view, and therefore valuable for this study.   
 
The discussion in this chapter will advance through the sections of global 
governance, the public-private distinction, normative standards of legitimacy, the 
differences of accountability standards in the public and the private sector and 
ultimately the choice of the theoretical framework is briefly explained.  
3.1 Global Governance  
The debates in the global governance literature examine the subject of 
accountability and democracy at the global level. Grant and Keohane point out 
that global governance is in need of appropriate accountability mechanisms in 
order to be legitimate. The difficulty in developing such accountability 
mechanisms is that these cannot be reproduced from the familiar democratic 
nation-state setting, but must be based on the particular characteristics of the 
global context (Grant – Keohane 2005:29,34). Examining accountability from the 
global perspective focusing in particular on multilateral organisations, Keohane 
claims that accountability is essentially a power relationship. In the case of power 
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asymmetries accountability is weakened. Consequently, power holders will seek 
to avoid accountability when this does not endanger other objectives. Keohane 
distinguishes between internal and external accountability. Internal accountability 
is generally related to the delegation of power, whereas external accountability 
concerns the people or communities affected by the activities in question. In the 
global setting, it is the external form of accountability that is most critical from a 
normative point of view (Grant – Keohane 2005:40-41, Keohane 2005:49, 
Keohane 2006:79). 
   
Held suggests that in parallel with the situation in the nation-state, where 
democratic accountability signifies that power holders are accountable to the 
broad publics, then in the global setting democratic accountability must likewise 
entail that agents whose actions make a sufficient great impact on the lives of 
people in other places must report and be subject to sanctions from these people. 
In contrast, Keohane claims that this might not necessarily be the case, e.g. in the 
case of intergovernmental organisations, the organisations are accountable to the 
Member States rather than to individuals or communities that are affected by their 
policies. According to Keohane, the external accountability gaps are most 
pronounced for entities, which are not traditionally held accountable on a 
transnational basis, e.g. multinational corporations (MNCs)
1
. As a result of the 
increased economic power of MNCs, these companies are seen as important 
global actors with substantial political influence. Fuch et al. emphasise the 
importance of examining the role of TNCs because of the divergence of interests 
between private economic interest and public interests. The critical question is 
how to make sense of democratic accountability in connection to TNCs (Fuch et 
al. in Erman - Uhlin 2010: 43-44). TNCs may cause vast damages when acting 
only in their own interests. Therefore, arrangements for external accountability is 
essential if corporations should play a role in the area of public governance (Grant 
– Keohane 2005:37-38, Fuch et al. in Erman - Uhlin 2010:59), Keohane 2005:48-
50, Keohane 2006:77,80-82). In the case of TNCs, it is evident that the nation-
state setting is not helpful in developing accountability mechanisms. The reason is 
that TNCs rather than elected by a demos are controlled by its shareholders. In 
concrete terms, the key question is how to accommodate the internal 
accountability of TNCs with the external accountability of people being affected 
by their actions. This divergence of interests will be considered in detail later in 
this chapter. Before that the next section will reflect on the critical distinction 
between the public and private sphere. 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
1
 Multinational corporations (MNCs) and transnational corporations (TNCs) are here used 
interchangeable. Despite the difference between the two categories, this is not central to the argument 
outlined.    
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3.2 Public versus Private  
The demarcation between public and private is not a straightforward exercise. It is 
primarily an important field of contestation. It is a significant demarcation setting 
up a constitutive ordering principle of social life. It is deep-rooted and continuous, 
but nevertheless it constantly evolves over time. Dingwerth and Hanrieder argue 
that in a globalised context, the distinction of public and private might not be 
consistent because of the gradual intersection of actor spheres, issue areas, and 
rules (Bexell - Mörth in Eds. Bexell - Mörth 2010:9-11, Dingwerth - Hanrieder in 
in Eds. Bexell - Mörth 2010:83). Nevertheless, as emphasized by Bexell and 
Mörth, the public-private distinction has important implication of what is 
politicised and depoliticised. While the field belonging to the public spheres 
becomes legitimised as objects of politics and public scrutiny, simultaneously the 
private field is depoliticised (Bexell - Mörth in Eds. Bexell - Mörth 2010:9-11).  
 
It is suggested that the public-private distinction is often replicated in a 
superficial manner in the PPP literature as well as in international relations (IR) 
literature. Frequently, states are automatically associated with “public”, while 
companies and civil society are associated with “private”. Therefore, a less 
simplified approach might be to consider “public” in terms of collective 
characteristics, and not just as associated with the state.  
 
In the policy context of new public management (NPM) Bexell and Mörth 
highlight that a paradigm shift has taken place in the public sector in recent 
decades, which has meant the marketisation of sectors that traditionally belonged 
to the state and the public sector. This trend of marketisation is promoted through 
the liberal belief that market mechanisms offer the answer to what is regarded as 
the bureaucratic inefficiencies in the public sector. In particular, decentralisation 
and competition are promoted on the conviction that the public sector should 
adopt a business-like model of operation, while simultaneously preserving the 
public character of democratic accountability (Bexell - Mörth in Eds. Bexell - 
Mörth 2010:9-11, Bresser - Pereira 2004: 109, Dingwerth - Hanrieder in Eds. 
Bexell - Mörth 2010:91, Mörth 2009:100-101,104). At the European level, Mörth 
demonstrates the remarkable changes that have taken place in the public utilities 
infrastructure. Such liberalisations and privatisations have resulted in a modified 
role of public actors from that of provider to engaging in supervisory and 
monitory tasks (Bexell - Mörth in Eds. Bexell - Mörth 2010:9-11, Mörth 
2009:100,103). The tension between effectiveness and democratic governance 
will be considered from the perspective of normative legitimacy in the following 
section. 
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3.3 Normative Standards of Legitimacy  
Normative legitimacy is based on norms, values and principles of liberal 
democracy, in particular accountability, transparency, inclusion and deliberation. 
Accordingly, the governance must be based on values like transparency, the rule 
of law, accountability, fairness, inclusion, participation, representation and 
deliberation. In addition, values of effectiveness and policy performance can also 
be included in a normative concept of legitimacy.   
 
Scharpf defines legitimacy as to “imply a socially sanctioned obligation to 
comply with government policies even if these violate the actor’s own interests or 
normative preferences, and even if official sanctions could be avoided at low 
cost” (Scharpf 2006:1). Consequently, the requirement for legitimation differs 
according to the salience of the preferences that are potentially infringed. Policies 
infringing on profoundly held normative preferences of the governed requires 
particular resilient legitimating arguments. Scharpf claims that in a modern 
Western context, legitimacy depends predominantly on trust in institutional 
arrangements, which involves the two dimensions of input- and output legitimacy 
(Scharpf 1999:6, Scharpf 2006:1). However, the interrelation between the two 
dimensions may alter depending on the organisational structures in place. Scharpf 
points out that the dimensions of input- and output legitimacy are complementary 
and supplementary in a democratic nation-state setting. At the European level, 
Scharpf suggests that output-based legitimacy can be a viable way of achieving 
legitimacy in the absence of a European demos due to its potential effectiveness in 
realising consensual goals (Scharpf 1999:12,23,188).  
 
Input legitimacy, on the one hand, relates to the procedural aspects and 
requires policies based on transparency, fairness, inclusiveness and accountability. 
It can also be described as government by the people. Consequently, political 
choices are legitimate if and because they reflect the will of the people. This 
implies that policies are originating from the preferences of the community. 
Output legitimacy, on the other hand, concerns the effectiveness to achieve 
collective problem-solving capacity and performance. This can be illustrated as 
government for the people. As a result, political choices are legitimate if and 
because they effectively promote the common welfare of a particular 
constituency. In order to achieve this result output legitimacy must accommodate 
the tension between on the one hand avoiding wrongdoing by governors and 
abuse of particular interest and on the other hand facilitating the vigorous pursuit 
of the common interest and effective problem-solving. The principal-agent theory 
concentrates on preventing the abuse of particular interests through accountability 
structures. Stephan Ross defines the principal-agent relationship as: “An agency 
relationship has arisen between two (or more) parties when one, designated as 
the agent, acts for, on behalf of, or as a representative for the other, designated 
the principal, in a particular domain of decision problems.” (Ross 1973:134). 
Accordingly, accountability is the mechanism ensuring that the agent does not 
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abuse his authority and acts in the best interest of the principal. In particular, the 
accountability mechanism in the principal-agent relationship is put in place to 
ensure that the agent will not abuse the authority delegated by the principal, which 
could infringe on the interests of the governed (Grant – Keohane 2005:32, Streets 
and Blattner in Eds. Bexell - Mörth 2010:61). The accountability mechanism must 
include the prospect of sanctions, in particular if the tasks have not been properly 
executed (Grant – Keohane 2005:29-30,39-40, Oakerson 1989:114). However, the 
control mechanism expressed through the principal-agent relations is just one part 
of the elements contained in the concept of output legitimacy. As a result, it is 
suggested that an increase of safeguards to control potential abuse of 
governmental power will result in a rise of veto points, which imply a decreased 
capacity for effectiveness (Scharpf 1999:6, Scharpf 2006:1-4).  
  
Keohane suggests that different types of accountability assist different 
accountability holders (Keohane 2006:81). This subject is examined in the 
forthcoming section, which looks at the differences in accountability standards of 
public organisations and private companies. 
3.4 Differences of Accountability Standards  
Important for the public-private boundary is how legitimacy and accountability 
principles differ between these two spheres. Hurd suggests that legitimacy is a 
subjective quality, which is relational between the actor and institution (Hurd 
1999:5). Organisation theory emphasises how the organisational form and the 
institutional surrounding profoundly influence the trait and characteristics of 
particular organisations (Svedberg Helgesson in Eds. Bexell - Mörth 2010:27). 
Consequently, it is worth paying attention to the differences in the organisational 
form of public sector organisations and private for-profit companies in the context 
of accountability standards.   
 
Dingwerth and Hanrieder suggest differentiating between on the one hand 
public governance techniques and private governance structures on the other 
hand. In the case of public governance, the techniques are based on collective 
decision-making, while in case of private governance it is characterised by the 
unregulated or self-regulated interactions of individuals and collectives Dingwerth 
- Hanrieder in Eds. Bexell - Mörth 2010:96).  
 
Svedberg Helgesson focussing on PPPs involving for-profit firms argues that 
firms “are situated in a world of their own, ingrained with a specified set of 
values that differentiate them from other types of organisations embedded in other 
spheres and values, such as public sector organization” (Svedberg Helgesson in 
Eds. Bexell - Mörth 2010:27). Particularly, it means that private businesses are 
directed by profit-seeking behaviour focusing on economic values. In contrast, 
public or political organisations must reconcile multiple goals and values. This 
  16 
division of values between businesses and public organisations have been 
characterised by Zelizer as “hostile worlds” (Zelizer 2005). Svedberg Helgesson 
expresses the tension with the less value-laden concept of separate spheres 
(Svedberg Helgesson in Eds. Bexell - Mörth 2010:27). This concept emphasises 
that businesses enjoy a limited form of accountability, which is mainly directed 
towards economic values. Accordingly, if the objective of business activities is to 
harvest profit, this means that accountability to shareholders and investors become 
the central target for assessments of accountability. Furthermore, Shearer argues 
that accounting systems encourage or even force businesses to put economic 
interest first (Shearer 2002 referred in Svedberg Helgesson in Eds. Bexell - Mörth 
2010:27). Brunsson highlights that this kind of restrictiveness in business 
operations, implies that businesses can engage in almost any activity as long as it 
is profitable (Brunsson 1989 referred in Svedberg Helgesson in Eds. Bexell - 
Mörth 2010:27).       
 
In addition, Svedberg Helgesson examines the agent-principal relationship 
(discussed in the above section) in the business situation and compares it to the 
situation in the public organisation. In the principal-agent situation, the interests 
of the principal are to be promoted, while the potential opportunism of agent is be 
to be controlled. Such control is achieved through governance structures, and as 
argued by Miller these arrangements are social practices with fixed constitutive 
capacities, which frame the way business actors and processes are interpreted and 
made sense of. Consequently, the way that the governance structure is designed 
can have important implications on agents and their behaviour. What is seldom 
considered in the principal-agent context is the control of the principal. This can 
be explained by the fact that the preferences of the principal are taken for granted. 
As pointed out by Perrow particularly in the business context such control could 
be justified due to the “self-interest assumed to drive the model and obviously 
greater resources of the monitor, entrepreneur, CEO, or capitalist.” (Grant – 
Keohane 2005: 32, Perrow 1986:227, Svedberg Helgesson in Eds. Bexell - Mörth 
2010:28-29). It can certainly be discussed if such control should merely be limited 
to the business principal, or equally should apply to the public principal. On the 
other hand in the context of different values and the resulting distinctive 
accountability paradigms it is significant that the interests of business principals 
and public organisation principals correspondingly diverge, which can be assumed 
to create tension and conflict (Svedberg Helgesson in Eds. Bexell - Mörth 
2010:28-29).  
 
Svedberg Helgesson elaborates on what the divergent accountability standards 
signify. In particularly, she illustrates that the differences in accountability “for 
what” give rise to important differentiations between the business organisation 
and the public organisation. Businesses are accountable for and driven by 
economic interest, which results in high flexibility in the operations i.e. businesses 
can define and refine their business and relevant market repeatedly as they see fit. 
As a result, businesses are considered to be relatively more effective and efficient 
in producing goods and services (Svedberg Helgesson in Eds. Bexell - Mörth 
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2010:29-30, Peters – Pierre in Eds. Bexell - Mörth 2010:52). This stand in 
contrast to the situation for the public sector organisation, who from the outset do 
not choose “their markets” as businesses do, rather they are limited by territorial 
boundaries and citizenship. More importantly, public organisations are controlled 
in terms of democratic accountability. Peters and Pierre highlight the crucial 
importance of democratic accountability, and how it is can create substantial 
changes in public policy and the style of regimes (Peters – Pierre in Eds. Bexell - 
Mörth 2010:50). Accordingly, it is essential to place considerable emphasis on the 
procedural aspects and input legitimacy (discussed in the previous section). The 
accountability standard for the public organisation must incorporate “to whom”. 
As such, there is a clear link between government “for the people” and that “of the 
people”, which does not exist for businesses. By contrast, while businesses may 
have liberty in choosing their business activities, they are limited by the interests 
they can serve though the accountability principle of “to whom”.  
 
Consequently, when the two diverging accountability standards are to join 
forces in PPPs, they are not easily merged. Mörth’s analysis of PPP in the 
European context suggests that the tension between private efficiency on the one 
hand and public democratic accountability on the other hand is not addressed by 
the politicians or public officials. Efficiency is the key focus in the PPPs 
examined by Mörth.  Simultaneously, democratic accountability is taken for 
granted based on the formal chain of delegation. This is, however, without dealing 
with the private actors, who are not involved in the formal chain of delegation and 
their accountability is not touched upon. Consequently, private actors are part of 
the political process without being part of the democratic process (Mörth 
2009:115-116). In fact, the two different accountability models can result in trade-
offs between democratic and economic forms of accountability. In the North 
American context of PPPs, Vaillancourt Rosenau concludes that efficiency and 
cost reductions frequently is achieved by setting aside gains in criteria like 
accountability, democracy and equity (Vaillancourt Rosenau 2000:27,220). 
Furthermore, due to the strong interdependence between the concepts of 
accountability to whom and accountability for what, the two need to be 
considered simultaneously. As the accountability concepts differ considerable 
between the private business and the public organisation, Svedberg Helgesson 
argues that what is considered commendable from the perspective of the common 
good can seldom be imagined optimal for securing economic value and vice versa 
(Svedberg Helgesson in Eds. Bexell - Mörth 2010:29-30).  
 
Despite the clear differences of accountability, Svedberg Helgesson suggests 
at the same time that private companies might not be a homogeneous as what is 
frequently believed. Through the notion of “the extended enterprise” she 
underlines that due to the existence of multiple agency in such companies 
difficulties can emerge in terms of unity due to several principals with conflicting 
interests. Therefore, the private business can display a more or less unitary 
hierarchy (Svedberg Helgesson in Eds. Bexell - Mörth 2010:33-35, 37). While it 
is constructive to problematize the homogeneity and coherence of private 
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businesses as proposed by Svedberg Helgesson, the different set of accountability 
standards highlighting economic interest versus democratic process respectively 
for the private business and the public organisation as outlined above are critical 
differences. These distinct accountability mechanisms are very significant to 
consider in the further examination of the possible consequences of including 
education in TTIP.    
 
3.5 Choice of theoretical framework   
The normative framework has been chosen as the most apt for this study for very 
good reasons. As will be elaborated in further detail in the analysis, education has 
important consequences regarding (in)equality, the realisation of the social rights 
of citizenship and national identity. Consequently, it makes good sense to base the 
analysis on the normative force attached to education. In this manner, the 
theoretical framework permits realising the normative weight that education 
comprises and the role it plays in the construction of social life (Buckler in Eds. 
Marsh - Stocker 2002:179). Particularly, the differences of accountability 
standards for respectively the public and private sector have critical implications 
for the kind of democratic procedures and collective control that can be exercised 
(Buckler in Eds. Marsh – Stocker 2002:183). Therefore, the normative framework 
identifies important consequences regarding universally provided quality 
education.   
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4 The Education Case 
This chapter examines some of the main policy issues in relation to the case of 
education. The first section looks into the special role and function of education 
and the second section reflects upon the different arrangements of educational 
spending in the EU Member States, the US and Canada.  
4.1 ‘Education is Special’ 
This section explores the special role that education plays in the welfare state 
perspective. Busemeyer and Nikolai examine the relationship between education 
and the welfare state (Busemeyer - Nikolai in Castles et al. 2010). One important 
input to this debate was given by Harold Wilensky (1975), who argued that 
‘education is special’ and accordingly education should be observed and analysed 
differently from other parts of the welfare state due to its presumably more 
indirect effects on equality in contrast to social policies of the welfare state.  
 
Busemeyer and Nikolai acknowledge that there are significant differences 
between education and social policies, e.g. there are differences in e.g. centralised 
respective decentralised structures, and education entails both public and private 
benefits whereas other social policies to a greater extent contain predominantly 
social benefits. However, at the same time Busemeyer and Nikolai emphasise that 
education is significant in its role of indirectly and prospectively affecting the 
main distribution of incomes in the labour market, rather than encompassing 
income inequalities ex post in the arrangement of most social insurance policies. 
This so-called indirect characteristic is essential for Wilensky’s differentiating of 
education from other social policies as two different principles of social justice, 
with education as ‘equality of opportunities’ versus other social policies as 
‘equality of outcomes’. Consequently, it can be argued that education is a crucial 
determinant of (in)equality ex ante. Moreover, with the advent of the ‘knowledge’ 
economy and the enhanced importance of human capital, such a distinction is 
increasingly flawed. In addition, it is essential to stress the dominant relationship 
that exists between educational achievements and family background. Therefore, 
Busemeyer and Nikolai make the case that policy intervention in the field of 
education is a far more significant determining factor of equality than what is 
suggested by Wilensky (Busemeyer - Nikolai in Castles et al. 2010: 494-495). 
Education does however not exist in a vacuum, and consequently the relationship 
between education and other policies should be considered to be complementary 
rather than substitutes (Busemeyer - Nikolai in Castles et al. 2010:496). 
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According to Marshall, the right to education is an important element in the 
catalogue of social rights. Marshall emphasises that “the right to education is a 
genuine social right of citizenship, because the aim of education during childhood 
is to shape the future adult. Fundamentally, it should be regarded, not as the right 
of the child to go to school, but as the right of the adult citizen to have been 
educated” (Marshall 1964: 81-82).  
 
As such, Marshall calls attention to the fact that the full realisation of social 
rights of citizenship essentially requires the universal provision of a right to 
education alongside other social rights. The two different historical approaches to 
welfare and education of respectively the Bismarckian and the early 
democratisation phase in the US are illustrative. While in the Bismarckian welfare 
state, the provision of social insurance was an instrument, which was controlled 
by the ruling elite with the aim of delaying democratisation and suppressing the 
increasing power of labour. In contrast, during the early democratisation phase in 
the US the growth of education opportunities were supported, in line with 
Marshall’s argument due to the critical factor of education for citizenship 
(Busemeyer - Nikolai in Castles et al. 2010:504-505). 
 
The growing importance of human capital transforms the organisation of 
education. While previously the attainment of an education or training degree 
played the key role throughout the individual’s life cycle, increasingly the degree 
must be complemented with continuous training. Accordingly, one should take 
into account the increased significance attached to education throughout the 
lifecycle, from early childhood education and care to lifelong learning and further 
training (Busemeyer - Nikolai in Castles et al. 2010:507).  
 
In the book ‘The price of inequality’ Stiglitz addresses the growing problem of 
inequality in the US. When describing the overall problems of inequality, Stiglitz 
explains that inequality is strongly correlated with different opportunities to 
quality education: “Those who graduated from the best schools with the best 
grades had a better chance at the good jobs. But the system was stacked because 
wealthy parents sent their children to the best kindergartens, grade schools, and 
high schools, and those students had a far better chance of getting into the elite 
universities.” (Stiglitz 2012: xiv).   
 
In other words, access to good quality education depends in the US 
increasingly on the income, wealth, and education of the parents. This means that 
only the richer part of the population can afford and benefit from quality 
education. Subsequently, this education is the determining factor in obtaining a 
quality job. In order to reverse the current trend, Stiglitz emphasises that there is a 
need for a “concerted national effort” (Stiglitz 2012:275).  
While, he recognises that such a national effort will require some time, Stiglitz 
suggests prioritising the efforts to control the for-profit schools. In particular, to 
promptly introduce and implement regulations of the for-profit schools in order to 
secure the appropriate employment of public money. The main problem with the 
  21 
for-profit schools is that while they for the most part do not increase their 
students’ chances and opportunities they heavily indebt the students, often to the 
degree that students are unable to pay back the debt. At the same time the for-
profit schools benefit from state subsidies to fund their education programmes, 
which in the best case are of questionable quality (Stiglitz 2012: 75, 108, 195-196, 
275, US Senate’s Health, Education, Labour and Pensions Committee report: For 
Profit Higher Education: The Failure to Safeguard the Federal Investment and 
Ensure Student Success).     
4.2 Educational Spending  
This section will look into the patterns of spending on education in the EU 
Member States, the US and Canada based on data from the OECD’s Education at 
a Glance 2013 (OECD (2013), Education at a Glance 2013). It is central to look 
into the differences of educational spending in order to access the possible impact 
that trade rules can imply to the provision of education in the event of a TTIP 
agreement that includes education.  
 
The WTO Secretariat background note on education services observes that 
education is normally considered a “public consumption” item, which is often 
provided free of charge or at prices not reflecting the cost of production. 
Furthermore, the WTO points out that government spending has continued the 
main source of educational funding in most countries (WTO Education Services 
Background Note S/C/W/49 1998: 3). Nevertheless, in the assessment of the 
OECD’s Education at a Glance 2013, private resources are becoming increasingly 
prominent in the funding of education. Nevertheless, public funding continues to 
represents a very substantial part of the investment in education. This increased 
private funding is a clear indication that the balance between public and private 
financing of education is an important and contested policy issue. Private funding 
is particularly pronounced for early childhood education and care and tertiary 
education, where private funding mainly comes from households. This fact raises 
significant concerns regarding the implications for the equality and equity of 
access to quality education. The OECD raises concerns especially in relation to 
tertiary education. At this educational level a substantial and a growing share of 
private funding is apparent (OECD (2013), Education at a Glance 2013:196-198).  
Nevertheless, it is reasonable not to limit such concerns merely to the tertiary 
level. As pointed out in the quote by Stiglitz above, the quality of education 
attained at the previous levels is crucial for the attainment at the forthcoming 
levels. Furthermore, as mentioned in the above section access to education 
throughout the lifecycle is increasing important, in particular lifelong learning and 
further training.   
 
One key emphasis in the 2013 version of Education at a Glance is that even 
core sectors like education have been subject to budget cuts following the 
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financial crisis (OECD (2013), Education at a Glance 2013:182). While the 
impact of the financial crisis on education is outside of the scope of this study, it 
is nevertheless important to keep in mind throughout the analysis as liberalisations 
and privatisations are widespread consequences of such budget cuts and therefore 
even if the developments are taking place at different levels, such events can have 
a mutual reinforcing effect. 
   
The educational expenditure includes on the one hand public spending (by 
governments) and private spending (by enterprises and individual students and 
their families). The OECD data shows that expenditure on education largely 
comes from public budgets, although all countries have some degree of private 
spending. It is, however clearly visible that private spending is considerable more 
noticeable in the US and Canada compared to the average level of the EU 
Member States. Table 4.1 displays the picture of spending on education at all 
levels in respective public and private expenditure as percentage of GDP. Table 
4.2 presents the spending on tertiary education divided into public and private 
expenditure as percentage of GDP. In the case of tertiary education, table 4.2 
demonstrates that the position of private spending in the US and Canada is quite 
pronounced. In the EU Member States the level of private expenditure on tertiary 
education varies considerable. It ranges from countries such as Austria and 
Belgium that have very low private expenditure, to countries such as the UK and 
the Netherlands that have much higher levels of private expenditure. Despite this 
variation between the EU Member States, the amount of private expenditure is 
nevertheless substantially less pronounced in the EU Member States on average 
compared to the situation in the US and Canada. This becomes evidently when 
comparing the columns of EU average with the ones for the US and Canada. In 
percentage points the private expenditure on tertiary education is 20% on average 
in the EU, while 64% of the expenditure on tertiary education is privately 
financed in the US. Another visible characteristic is the ‘top position’ that the US 
and Canada occupy in spending on tertiary education as a result of the high levels 
of private spending.  
 
Nevertheless, this top position of expenditure this does not automatically 
correlate into a top position of quality education. In particularly, the concerns with 
for-profit schools in the US are illustrative in this regard. These for-profit schools 
charge very high students fees, but deliver education of poor quality. The poor 
quality can partly be explained by their distribution between profit distribution 
(19.4 % of revenue), marketing and recruiting (22.4 % of revenue) and teaching 
and training students (17.7 % of revenue). In addition, the US Senate report on 
For Profit Higher Education: The Failure to Safeguard the Federal Investment 
and Ensure Student Success noted the exceptional high amounts of compensations 
given to the CEOs of the for-profit schools, which on average was $7.3 million in 
2009. In contrast, the five highest paid leaders of large public universities the 
amount of compensation averaged $1 million (US Senate’s Health, Education, 
Labour and Pensions Committee report: For Profit Higher Education: The Failure 
to Safeguard the Federal Investment and Ensure Student Success:3-6). 
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Table 4.1  
Expenditure on education at all levels as percentage of GDP 
Data compiled from "Education at a Glance 2013" (OECD) 
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Table 4.2  
Expenditure on tertiary education as a percentage of GDP 
Date compiled from "Education at a Glance 2013" (OECD)  
Private
Public
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5 Education as a Tradable Service 
This chapter will analyse the potential consequences of including education into 
TTIP. The GATS arrangements are helpful to this analysis as TTIP is built on the 
foundations of GATS. Even so, TTIP are also likely to differentiate from the 
GATS e.g. in the listing approach to liberalisations. In addition, the intention is to 
include investment liberalisation and investment protection into TTIP.  
5.1 GATS and Education 
In this section the effects on education systems deriving from GATS will be 
discussed. Education is national as a matter of its raison d’être through the 
insertion and definition of ideas of social formation such as national identity, 
democracy and citizenship (Robertson et al. 2006:231).  
 
In particular, Robertson et al. address education as outlined in the Keynesian 
welfare regime. Here, the provision of education is a major social policy item that 
is mainly, but not exclusively, funded and provided by the state. Conditions of 
universal access are linked to the right of citizenship (Robertson et al. in Lauder et 
al. 2006:231). As already discussed in the previous chapter education is closely 
related to the right of citizenship as education is not exclusively, but fundamental 
to this right (Marshall 1964: 81-82). However, during the last decades a shift from 
a national to a post-national regime in education can be observed. In particular, 
this shift is noticeable when examining the change in scale of governance in 
education. The case in point is the inclusion of education in GATS. Firstly, it 
involves a change from the national to (either or both) supranational and 
subnational levels, and secondly it is visible in the coordination of educational 
governance (Robertson et al. in Lauder et al. 2006:232).  
 
This transformation means that whereas the state previously had full 
monopoly over all aspects of education, this is currently being limited to an 
unclear span of options with regulations appearing to be the only necessary 
element of state monopoly, and even that might be questioned. Education as a 
public good is decommodified, and therefore decommodified services are by 
definition not tradable. Fredriksson emphasises that GATS is not dealing with 
educational issues as educational or political matters, but merely as commercial 
and trade issues (Frederiksson 2004:426). Nevertheless, its political implication 
can be tangible. According to Robertson et al. GATS has played a major role in 
the process of changing the notion of education from primarily a public good 
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towards gradually a tradable service through the re-articulation of the nature, form 
and governance of education (Robertson et al. in Lauder et al. 2006:238). As 
pointed out in the background chapter on GATS the exemption of governmental 
authority, the GATS article I.3, is ambiguous due to the lack of common 
definitions. Accordingly, it is not even certain that primary and secondary 
education fall within the GATS exemption. Education systems are only exempted 
from GATS if they fulfil the requirements set out in GATS article I.3; which 
require that they must be entirely financed and administered by the state and 
without any commercial elements. However, not even the financing criterion is 
satisfied as figure 4.1 demonstrates. This is despite the fact that the financing 
predominantly comes from public budgets, even if the amount of private financing 
varies between countries. As discussed in the previous chapter, there is an 
apparent difference in the amount of private funding in the case of respectively 
the US (and to a lesser extend Canada) and the EU Member States. Moreover, it is 
uncertain if there remain any education systems that satisfy the conditions of the 
GATS exemption. Rather, most education systems are mixed systems, where the 
private sector plays a role, although to different degrees, and this role is in 
competition with the public sector. Robertson et al. furthermore argue that even 
the public-private test is not enough in defining whether GATS applies as school 
fees exist also in public systems. As a result, it may be argued that such school 
fees will imply that public education falls within the category of private 
commercial activity and therefore covered by GATS (Fredriksson 2004:426, 
Robertson et al. in Lauder et al. 2006:234-235, Adlung - Mattoo in Mattoo et al. 
2008:52).   
 
Although it can reasonably be argued that public education as such is not 
automatically excluded from the scope of the liberations in GATS, it does not 
imply that education from one day to another becomes commodified. Rather, the 
level of liberalisations depends on the specific commitments taken by Member 
States. In this regard, it is worth to notice that education is the least committed 
sector only after energy (WTO Education Services Background Note S/C/W/49 
1998:10). Nevertheless, Robertson et al. emphasise that the dangers to the 
education sector consist in the prospect of a process of gradual liberalisation, 
whereby education will be vulnerable to pressures of commodification over the 
next decade. Consequently, the inclusion of education can be argued to be 
consistent with such a process of increasingly commodification of education. In 
accordance with the GATS’ general framework of obligations, this pressure 
derives from the two key principles of most-favoured nation (MFN) (GATS 
article II) and national treatment (GATS article XVII). According to the MFN 
principle there shall be no discrimination between members of the agreement, i.e. 
trade concessions granted to one country must be granted to all GATS members. 
It is critical that the MFN principal applies to all services included in GATS 
regardless of whether a particular service is the object of a commitment. 
Accordingly, MFN implies that any measure taken by a body covered by GATS, 
which affects foreign services or service suppliers cannot be treated less 
favourable than like services or service suppliers from other members of GATS. 
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In contrast, the obligations of national treatment apply to the sectors listed in the 
Member’s schedule. National treatment implies that no discrimination in favour of 
national providers of like service and service suppliers is accepted. According to 
the national treatment principal even formally identical treatment can be regarded 
as violating the requirement of national treatment if a particular measure still 
“modifies the conditions of competition in favour of domestic suppliers” (GATS 
article XVII:3). As national treatment relates to a broad range of national 
measures including measures involving subsidies, it implies that unconditional 
commitments on national treatment requires that subsidies must be granted on a 
non-discriminatory basis between national services and service providers and the 
“like” service and service providers of other GATS members. Here it is of critical 
importance that GATS indicates a very narrow definition of public services. 
Therefore, public services are not considered ‘special’ compared to other 
services’. In addition, it is noteworthy that “like service and service suppliers” in 
article XVII does not take into account the mode of supply. Accordingly, different 
modes of supply could be employed to offer a “like service”. Consequently, if a 
country has made commitments on national treatment, such subsidies that it 
provides to its own service or service providers must be made available to foreign 
services supplied inside its territory regardless of the mode of supply (Colas - 
Gottlieb 2011:15-19, Robertson et al. in Lauder et al. 2006:235, Scherrer 
2005:488,492). In the education sector, such “like services” across different 
modes of supply could require that the same subsidies are to be given to the local 
public school as to distance learning from a foreign provider. The implication of 
granting “equivalent” subsidies to foreign education providers as the to public 
education system is discussed in more detail below.   
 
As previously mentioned the four modes of supply of GATS (please refer to 
chapter 2) include cross-border supply, consumption abroad, commercial presence 
and the presence of natural persons. The most common form of trading education 
is trough mode 2 of consumption abroad, which for instance includes students 
studying abroad. There is as a consequence an increasing competition for foreign 
students, which is demonstrated by the marketing of higher education institutions. 
However, another important way of trading education is through mode 3 of 
commercial presence, whereby foreign education suppliers set up local branch 
campuses or institutions (WTO Education Services Background Note S/C/W/49 
1998:7-8). According to the WTO, the longest list of barriers to trade in services 
can be found in the mode 3 of commercial presence. Consequently, it can be 
expected that it is the mode 3 that will have the greatest impact on public 
education. In this mode, the WTO identifies in all seven ‘barriers’; (1) The 
inability to be recognised as a degree- or certificate grating educational institution, 
e.g. inability to achieve the status as a university. (2) Measures that limit direct 
investment by foreign education investors. (3) National requirements about setting 
up an institution, including national advantages such as establishment grants. (4) 
Nationally or professionally controlled needs tests in order to control the supply of 
particular types of labour. (5) Restrictions on foreign teachers. (6) The existence 
of government monopolies. (7) High levels of government subsidisation of local 
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institutions, which are not available to foreign providers (WTO Education 
Services Background Note S/C/W/49 1998:8, Robertson et al. in Lauder et al. 
2006:237).  
 
Two main potential consequences can be expected if these alleged barriers to 
trade in education as identified by the WTO under GATS, were to be removed. 
Firstly, the result of the commitment to GATS rules in the education sector, 
despite subject to the specific commitments, would generally require the right of 
access and operation to foreign education providers, including guaranteeing the 
right to invest, to be given degree-granting authority, to be eligible for 
government grants for their own operations or for their students, or to send in their 
own labour. Consequently, significant pressures on the public education can be 
anticipated or at the very minimum, it can be expected to profoundly affect the 
public nature of education. This can be explained by the very nature of the 
education sector, which is still primarily organised and funded by the state. Table 
4.1 demonstrates that education continues to be mainly publicly funded (OECD 
(2013), Education at a Glance 2013). Moreover, foreign providers’ access to state 
funding is exceptional in most countries. Therefore, foreign education providers if 
allowed to operate would essentially be competing with publicly funded education 
institutions. Consequently, Scherrer argues that foreign educational providers can 
be considered as discriminated against if not by intent than by the very structure 
of the education system (Scherrer 2005: 490). The GATS terminology of creating 
a level-playing field in the education sector would imply that barriers to free trade 
were to be removed, whereby the private sector essentially would be in a position 
to undermine public delivery of education by challenging government monopolies 
and subsidies designated to the public sector. Partly, the challenge to government 
monopoly in the sector is based on the assumption that government funded 
institutions is given unfair advantages either via direct subsidies or cross-
subsidisation within an institution. As a consequence, public institutions would be 
exposed to considerable pressures to behave more like commercial enterprises and 
adopt profit-making motives instead of other motives, notably its mission of 
providing universal quality education. The non-discrimination concept of GATS 
sets substantial limitations to the scope for public and democratic choice in 
education sector.  
 
In fact, Scherrer argues that the risks to public education are intensified by 
recent reforms implemented at the national level in many countries that tend to 
‘commercialise’ public services due to budget constraints (Scherrer 2005:493). 
According to this argument, such recent reorganisation of the education sector, 
where private elements are playing a larger role in the provision of education and 
which introduces elements of profitability and competitiveness makes education 
even more likely to be considered to fall under the GATS rule. This is true, 
despite the fact that education is still predominantly publicly funded. In essence, 
Robertson et al. contend that the WTO through the GATS process has the 
potential to institute a new set of global rules in the governance of education to be 
implemented in national territories. Consequently, such global rules could have 
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the effect of transforming the state’s power and the processes of development 
within and across nation-states (Robertson et al. in Lauder et al. 2006:237-238, 
Scherrer 2005:490,505). This argument focusing on the implication of these 
global rules of education governance resembles well with the argument in the PPP 
literature, which stresses that within the policy context of NPM the public sector 
has witnessed a paradigm shift in which it is increasingly subject to adopt 
business-like models of operations (Bexell - Mörth in Eds. Bexell - Mörth 2010:9-
10). In fact, Scherrer even points out that such changes at the national level can 
reinforce the pressures from GATS on the publicly funded education sector. 
While it is outside the scope of this study to enter into detail on how these two 
processes taking place respectively at the national and global level reciprocally 
influence each other, what becomes clear from the education case is that there is a 
strong tension between the business model and the public model of supplying 
education. While the private model focuses on ensuring profits to CEOs and 
shareholders, the public model must ensure that education is supplied in 
accordance with democratic values including equality and equity by the universal 
provision of quality education. Such universal provision cannot be expected under 
private delivery. Principally, private companies concentrate on the “cream-
skimming” markets segments that yield the biggest profit, which is fully logical 
and natural from the profit logic. Nevertheless, it results in markets failures, as 
there will be an underinvestment in those areas of education where private 
companies are not able to extract profits.        
 
Apparently, it seems to be a puzzle to explain how an area like education, 
which is closely linked to citizenship and national identity, can be covered by the 
global rules of GATS, which are legally binding. In explaining the very influential 
role that GATS plays in the global governance of education, Robertson et al. 
argue that the main reason that GATS has been so influential is based on the 
exceptional standing of the WTO as an international organisation. In contrast to 
other international organisations, the WTO is mandated to establish binding rules 
governing trade between WTO members. These trade rules stretch into various 
areas of domestic legislation. In addition, the formation of GATS implied a set of 
legally enforceable rules on trade in services that included cross-border and the 
commercial presence in the export market. Furthermore, GATS includes a build-
in agenda, which is set out in GATS article XIX stating that WTO members 
“shall enter into successive rounds of negotiations to achieve a progressively 
higher level of liberalisation”. While governments had the option to make 
exemptions, such exemptions were not meant exceed a period of ten years and 
they would be subject to period review by the Council for Trade in Services or 
renegotiation every 5 year (Robertson et al. in Lauder et al. 2006: 233-234). Based 
on these mandatory elements, the GATS process of liberalisations is nearly 
irreversible as any kind of withdrawal from WTO is extremely difficult. This is 
because GATS in practice introduces a standstill clause where once a commitment 
is undertaken, it cannot easily be cancelled. From a trade perspective “the very 
purpose of commitments is to enhance the stability and predictability of trade and 
investment conditions” (Adlung - Mattoo in Mattoo et al. 2008:61). Moreover, 
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according to this perspective, more relaxed possibilities for modification or 
reversal would contradict the intentions of stability and predictability (Adlung - 
Mattoo in Mattoo et al. 2008:62). However, from the perspective of normative 
legitimacy such stability comes at a very high cost. Even if a new political 
majority comes to power with a mandate to withdraw certain commitments 
previously taken by that country, the new government will nevertheless be bound 
by the commitments taken by its predecessors. Scharpf argue that the requirement 
for legitimation differs according to the salience of the preferences that potentially 
are infringed. Accordingly, such policies that are infringing on profoundly held 
normative preferences of the governed require particular legitimating arguments 
(Scharpf 1999:6). Since what is at stake essentially is the will of the people, it 
must be presumed that such a permanent lock in would require particular 
legitimating arguments. In the GATS framework commitments can only be 
modified three years after the entering into force and must be accompanied by an 
offer of compensation to other GATS member. In practice, while such a 
withdrawal of certain commitments is possible they would require liberalisations 
in other sectors (Fredriksson 2004:428-429, Scherrer 2005:487,491, Woods – 
Narlikar 2001:572).  
 
Regarding the EU’s position it is noteworthy that Robertson et al. point out 
that until recently the EU aimed to slow down the implementation of GATS 
despite pressure from the US and business interest groups to accelerate the 
implementation (Robertson et al. in Lauder et al. Halsey 2006:234). Accordingly, 
if this is indeed the case, this might also have implications for trade agreements 
currently being negotiated including TTIP. One of the ways that the EU has held 
back the implementation of GATS is through its specifications and exceptions on 
public services in its schedule. In particular, it includes the following three 
measures; it limited its schedule to include privately financed services, it included 
a broad and non-exhaustive definition of the public sector and it reserved the right 
to subsidisation. Nevertheless, the major problem with these safeguards to public 
services is their lack of definition and specification. As a result, these restrictions 
only offer limited protection to education and other public services. In particular, 
there is lack of clarity of what constitutes a privately financed education service. 
Consequently, will “publicly funded” mean that 100% of the education sector 
must be publicly funded or should it merely fulfil for example a target of 50% 
public funding to be considered “publicly funded” education? This is essentially 
the same problem as discussed above based on the GATS exception on 
governmental authority. Additionally, the uncertainty of what comprises a 
privately financed education service is likely to be progressively challenged with 
an increased role of private participation and funding in the public education 
system. Similarly, the EU reserves the right to restrict market access to the public 
utilities sector, however again the problem is the lack of definition and clarity. 
Consequently the education sector is put in a vulnerable situation because it is not 
included in any of the examples given of public utilities (Krajewski 2013: 31, 
Scherrer 2005:504-505).  
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It is not very surprising to find pressures from in particular businesses to make 
education and other service sectors subject to the market and free trade given the 
very substantial expenditures in the education sector and other “sensitive” service 
sectors. According to UNESCO (2000) global public expenditure on education 
amounted to $1386,8 billion in 1997 (Robertson et al. in Lauder et al. 2006, 
UNESCO 2000:118). While the UNESCO’s estimated number is indeed old, it is 
used here merely to give a rough indication of the amounts involved in public 
education. The education sector has been targeted for restructuring given its 
importance in terms of reproduction of labour power and in structuring national 
identity. At the same time, education is viewed as a potentially very lucrative 
sector. In particular US companies hold a strong position in the field of education 
services, which partly can be explained by the already relatively high percentage 
of private funded education services, especially in the area of tertiary education as 
illustrated in table 4.2. The US export of education and training reached $8.2 
billion with a trade surplus in education services of $7 billion in 1997 (Robertson 
et al. in Lauder et al. 2006: 230-232). Both the US export and trade surplus in the 
education sector have increased greatly since the late 1990s. According to the 
figures (below) from the US Department of Commerce in the Economics and 
Statistics Administration Issue Brief #01-11, the export of education services 
passed $20 billion and the US’ surplus exceeded $15 billion in 2010 (ESA Issue 
Brief #01-11, U.S. Trade in Private Services, U.S. Department of Commerce, 
Economics and Statistics Administration). From these numbers, it is not surprising 
that the US insists on including education services into multilateral agreements 
such as GATS or bilateral agreements such as TTIP. 
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5.2 TTIP and Education 
This section will analyse the potential consequences of including education into 
the scope of TTIP. The previous section is the foundation to the analysis being 
carried out here due to GATS’ role as constituting the fundamentals to trade 
agreements such as one analysed here. On top of GATS’s basis, further elements 
of liberalisation are introduced in the “new generation” FTAs currently being 
negotiated by the EU, which are dubbed “GATS plus”. Consequently, in the EU 
Directives for the TTIP negotiations it states in paragraph 3 that “The Agreement 
shall provide for the reciprocal liberalisation of trade and investment in goods 
and services as well as rules on trade-related issues, with a high level of 
ambition going beyond the existing WTO commitments” (Council of the 
European Union, EU Directives for TTIP negotiations, 2013, paragraph 3, 
emphasis added).  
 
The US’s chief negotiator, Dan Mullaney, has publicly stated the intention of 
the US to expand liberalisation for all education services in TTIP at the chief 
negotiators’ briefing during the fourth round of negotiations. Similarly, in the EC 
consultation on education services to Member States via the Council’s Trade 
Policy Committee (TPC) it is stated “the US flagged interest in privately-operated 
adult and other education services” (EC Consultation to the Trade Policy 
Committee (Services and Investment) on education services 2014:1). Moreover, 
the consultation clearly sets out the objective of the US to reach a TTIP agreement 
with no reservations on market access and national treatment (EC Consultation to 
the Trade Policy Committee (Services and Investment) on education services 
2014:1). Before elaborating in detail on the case of education in the currently 
negotiated TTIP, the broader framework, which the TTIP negotiations is part of, 
is presented.  
 
Regarding the significance of FTA’s on the characteristic of public services 
Krajewski emphasises that the tension between international trade and public 
services is not predominantly a highly technical discussion about very specific 
details. Rather, it concerns the very future of public services, so-called “services 
of general interest”, and the impact on regulatory autonomy and public policy 
space from trade policy (Krajewski 2011:6, Krajewski 2013:4-5). Public services 
are part of the public-private contestation, which implies that public services are 
continuously evolving over time. In the context of NPM, this contestation has 
resulted in considerable marketisation of sectors that used to be core public 
service sectors (Bexell - Mörth in Eds. Bexell – Mörth 2010:9-11). However, 
recently developments point in the opposite direction with re-municipalisation in 
some countries (Krajewski 2013:4).  Moreover, the contestation will play out 
differently across societies, who will find different solutions to the public-private 
contestation and consequently the specific character of public services 
differentiates across space. In other words, public services are characterised by its 
dynamic and flexible nature both across time and space (Krajewski 2013: 28). The 
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exemptions of public services in trade agreements must take into account and 
incorporate these characteristics in order to provide the necessary space for the 
constant contestation of the public-private sphere, which is a basic condition of 
politics and democratic decision-making. At the same time, the exemptions of 
public services must be clear-cut to ensure the de-facto exclusion of public 
services under legally binding FTAs. The EC has acknowledged that the relation 
between public services and international trade is controversial and topical in two 
internal papers (Krajewski 2013:4). In the Reflections Paper on Services of 
General Interest the problems concerning public services under the GATS 
approach is affirmed. Consequently, it is mentioned that there is a need for greater 
legal certainty as no commonly agreed definitions of neither public utilities nor 
public services exist (European Commission, Reflections Paper on Services of 
General Interest in Bilateral FTAs (Applicable to both Positive and Negative 
Lists) 2011:1). Nevertheless, officially the EC does not acknowledge this 
uncertainty for public services, but stresses instead that public services are 
recognised in EU law and therefore protected in international trade (DG Trade, 
Protecting public services in TTIP and other EU trade agreements). Krajewski 
similarly highlights that the EC has a legal obligation to respect the special role of 
Services of General Interest in EU FTAs due to its status as a common 
constitutional value of the EU and its Member States as specified in article 14 
TFEU and Protocol No. 26 on Services of General Interest (Krajewski 2013:3-5). 
The EU Directives for the TTIP negotiations similarly refers to the obligation of 
preserving the Services of General Interest (Council of the European Union, EU 
Directives for TTIP negotiations, paragraph 19).  
 
Nevertheless, the GATS plus agreements aim to undertake further 
liberalisations, which poses potentially serious consequences for public services. 
These ”new generation” FTAs differ from the GATS approach in the structure of 
specific commitments, the emergence of new rules on sectoral regulations and 
competition, and the increasing inclusion of investment and investment 
protection. (Krajewski 2013:3-4). Before examining the likely consequences of 
those new elements, the specific commitments proposed for the education sector 
in TTIP will be discussed in the following part. It is the specific commitments on 
educational services that provide important indications of the likely consequences 
for the education sector. Previously, education has been one of the least covered 
sectors only after energy (WTO Education Services Background Note S/C/W/49 
1998:10).  Nevertheless, ensuing from the intention to achieve ever-greater levels 
of liberalisation in GATS, the real vulnerabilities faced by the education sector 
consists in intensifying the level of liberalisation in a gradual, but ever-increasing 
manner. While this expected process of gradual liberalisation has received rather 
disappointing results from a trade perspective in the GATS context (Adlung – 
Mattoo in Mattoo et al. 2008:74-75), it appears that new fora are being provided 
for such purposes, particularly in bilateral FTAs like TTIP or plurilateral trade 
negotiations like the Trade in Services Agreement (TiSA). While, the current 
analysis in limited to examining the possible consequences of including education 
into TTIP, there are noticeable similarities, which is apparent from the fact that 
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while the previously mentioned consultation on education services concerns 
primarily TTIP negotiations, the consultation states that the issue is similarly 
relevant for the TiSA negotiations (EC Consultation to the Trade Policy 
Committee (Services and Investment) on education services 2014:1-2). As 
previously mentioned the US has clearly stated that the intention is to expand 
liberalisation for all education services in TTIP. Furthermore, the US aims to 
reach a TTIP agreement with no reservations on market access and national 
treatment in privately adult and other education services. On market access, the 
US aims in particular to excluding quotas and economic needs tests and 
concerning national treatment the US is particularly keen on excluding nationality 
or local presence requirements (EC Consultation to the Trade Policy Committee 
(Services and Investment) on education services 2014:1).  
 
The negotiations are still at an early stage in the service area. So far the EU 
and the US have exchanged their offer on trade in services and investment and 
discussed the respective offers. According to the EC’s State of Play document 
published after the 6
th
 round of negotiation in July, these offers need further 
discussion (EC State of Play of TTIP negotiations after the 6
th
 round 2014:2). The 
EU’s TTIP draft services and investment offer of 26 May 2014 mirrors the EU’s 
horizontal limitation included in GATS. In both schedules the scope of the 
commitments on education services applies exclusively to privately funded 
education services. In addition, privately funded other education services are 
excluded from the obligations (WTO Communication from the European 
Communities and its Member States, Draft consolidated GATS Schedule 
S/C/W/273 2006:170-171, 440-441, TTIP draft offer on services and investment 
2014:18, 80). As emphasised previously in the context of GATS, the EU’s 
commitment to privately funded education services without defining what is 
exactly understood by the term causes considerable uncertainty regarding future 
interpretation. The definition of privately funded education has potentially 
important consequences for the public education sector. Public education is 
mainly publicly funded, but contains different levels of private funding as 
visualised in table 4.1. Furthermore, private financing is on the increase in many 
public education systems (OECD (2013), Education at a Glance 2013:196). 
Increased private financing may further complicate the already blurred line 
between publicly- and privately funded education. Moreover, recent domestic 
reforms implemented in a number of countries, which tend to ‘commercialise’ 
public services and make public services ‘profit-oriented’, add to the likelihood 
that public services will be challenged as privately funded education services 
under international trade agreements (Scherrer 2005:504-505). As a result, the 
exception on privately funded education gives a limited and possibly even a 
decreased limited protection to the public education sector based on recent 
domestic reforms.  
 
In the revised edition of the EU’s initial TTIP services and investment offer of 
30 June 2014, the limitation to privately funded education services is specified in 
more detail and reads “The EU reserved the right to adopt or maintain any 
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measure with regard to education services which receive public funding or State 
support in any form, and are therefore not considered to be privately funded 
(CPC 92) and with regard to privately funded other education services (CPC 
929)” (EU’s TTIP initial offer on trade in services and investment 2014:21). 
Krajewski points out that some of the uncertainties concerning what constitute 
publicly funded versus privately funded education and therefore the insecurity 
exposed to public education by subjecting it to the legally binding FTAs can be 
avoided by adding “which receive public funding or State support in any form”, as 
the scope of the exemption would include fully and partially State-funded 
institutions (Krajewski 2013:31).  
 
However, a complete carve-out would yield better protection to public 
education. Carve-outs are located in the framework agreement and it applies 
similarly to annexes and later revisions of the agreement. As a result, the carve-
out offers the most far-reaching scope of the possible exemptions in FTAs. In 
contrast, in the EU’s initial TTIP offer on trade in services and investment the 
limitation on privately funded education services is spelled out in the horizontal 
commitments (quote above), while the sector-specific commitments merely state 
that commitments apply to privately funded services. As explained by Krajewski 
due to the different application of the exemptions the broadest scope is provided 
in the carve-out, while the coverage of the exemption decreases first in the sector-
specific commitments and then decreases additionally in the horizontal 
commitments (Krajewski 2013:32-33). Consequently, the exemption provided to 
public education in the EU’s TTIP offer is rather narrow in scope. Previously in 
the context of GATS, the US has requested the EU to undertake further 
commitments in the education sector, however Scherrer argues that so far the US 
has not made commitments to the same extent as the EU has already undertaken 
in the education sector (Scherrer 2005:502). During the last round of GATS 
negotiations other countries, possibly including the US, requested among other 
things the EU to make commitments in higher education and adult education in 
general without the limitation on privately financed services (Scherrer 2005:502), 
thereby essentially open those part of the education sector entirely up to trade. 
Traditionally, the EU does not take any commitments on other education services 
due to the open-ended definition of these services “covering all other education 
services not elsewhere classified” (WTO Education Services Background Note 
S/C/W/49 1998:15, Scherrer 2005:502). This tradition is continued in the EU’s 
TTIP draft offer on services and investment (2014:18), despite the US interest in 
privately-operated other education services (EC Consultation to the Trade Policy 
Committee (Services and Investment) on education services 2014:1).     
  
From the draft TTIP offer and the initial TTIP offer on services and 
investment it is apparent that negotiations in this area are at a rather early stage. In 
the EU’s initial TTIP offer on trade in services and investment of 30 June, the 
offer reserves the right to possible modifications of commitments due to the 
unprecedented scope of TTIP (EU’s TTIP initial offer on trade in services and 
investment 2014:1-2). Nevertheless, the early stage of this part of the negotiations, 
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comparing the Member States’ sector-specific commitments in respectively 
GATS and TTIP expose a trend of decreasing levels of limitations concerning 
privately funded services. While Member States in GATS
2
 included specific 
limitations generally on all modes of supply, in the TTIP draft offer such 
limitations are generally limited to commercial presence and presence of natural 
persons  (WTO Communication from the European Communities and its Member 
States, Draft consolidated GATS Schedule S/C/W/273 2006:160-171, 432-441, 
TTIP draft offer on services and investment 2014:18-19,78-80). As previously 
discussed, commitments in mode 3 would imply the biggest pressures on the 
education sector. The increased scope of commitments in the education sector is 
significant on its own, but it could be further increased or decreased during the 
negotiations, depending on the relative strength between the negotiation partners 
and the importance attached respectively to preserve exemptions versus to achieve 
liberalisations in the education sector, but also how the negotiations on other issue 
areas eventually play out. Previous trade negotiations demonstrate that the critical 
part of the negotiations take place at the very end of the negotiations and at such a 
point in time different issue areas are connected into so-called package deals 
(Scherrer 2005:506). According to comments made by the outgoing EU Trade 
Commissioner, De Gucht, during a press briefing on 9 September 2014, it is likely 
that the US prefers the approach of “one big end game”. Such an approach would 
aim at making trade-offs across all sectors in a rather late stage of the negotiations 
(Inside U.S. Trade 12/9/2014).        
 
The analysis will now turn to how these new elements of the “new generation” 
FTAs will affect the education sector. The method of scheduling, the ratchet and 
standstill mechanism, regulatory cooperation and investment protection will be 
analysed below. In order to comprehend the possible consequences of including 
education into the scope of the TTIP agreement, it is critical to access the impact 
of the method of scheduling. The two main approaches to scheduling are the 
“positive list” and “negative list”. Krajewski emphasises that the differences 
between the two approaches is significant, in particular in the case of public 
services, even if the exact scope of the disciplines will depend on the level of the 
commitments adopted (Krajewski 2013:9). In contrast, the EC argues that these 
two different approaches of scheduling do not have implications on the protection 
of public services (DG Trade, Protecting public services in TTIP and other EU 
trade agreements). The EU has previously used the positive list in accordance 
with the GATS approach as described above, however this is not the case with 
TTIP and CETA. In CETA a negative list approach is adopted, while in TTIP the 
EU’s service offer applies a hybrid approach consisting of a negative list 
regarding national treatment and a positive list regarding market access. 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
2
 The consolidated GATS schedule referred to here covers 25 of the EU’s Member States. 
Nevertheless, this schedule has not yet entered into force. As the EU’s previous GATS schedule 
covers just 15 of the EU’s Member States, the consolidated schedule of 2006 is used here in order 
to compare the EU’s TTIP offer on services with the EU’s GATS schedule.  
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Nevertheless, the US generally adopts the negative list approach in its FTAs 
including in the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) (Krajewski 
2013:9-10, 37-38). Therefore, it can be assumed that the US prefers to maintain 
this approach in the TTIP negotiations. The US’s chief negotiator, Mullaney, 
showed dissatisfaction with the EU’s hybrid approach highlighting that the US 
thinks TTIP should be based on the negative list approach during the press 
conference of the sixth round of the TTIP negotiations on 18 July. The EU has 
defended its approach based on the US’s refusal to give a detailed list of sub-
federal restrictions to service providers in states and local jurisdictions (Inside 
U.S. Trade 25/7/2014). In other words, the EU has signalled that its hybrid 
approach is not definite, but part of the negotiating tactics and consequently could 
be changed depending on the level of market access to the US sub-federal level.  
 
In the positive list approach the sectors to be liberalised are listed. This means 
that core obligations like market access and national treatment apply only to the 
sectors listed, and these sectors are subject to the conditions included in the list. In 
contrast, the negative list applies the core obligations in an overall manner, and 
sectors will only be excluded if explicitly listed in annexes to the agreement. 
Moreover, regulatory flexibility is restricted because current and future policy 
space will merely apply to those measures that are positively listed in the annexes. 
This is the reason why the negative list is termed “list it or loose it”. Typically, the 
negative list differentiates between two kinds of reservations, which are linked 
respectively an Annex I and Annex II of the agreement. The measures listed in 
Annex I contain the existing measures that do not follow the core obligations. 
Countries can maintain, reintroduce and revise the measures, however only as 
long as they retain the same level of conformity to the obligations of the 
agreement. This results in the so-called “ratchet effect”, which means that future 
liberalisation measures become automatically locked in and therefore it contains a 
strong tendency towards liberalisation. The EU Directives for the TTIP 
negotiations are quite clear in this respect, it reads: “The aim of the negotiations 
on trade in services will be to bind the existing autonomous level of liberalisation 
of both Parties at the highest level of liberalisation captured in existing 
FTA”(Council of the European Union, EU Directives for TTIP negotiations, 
2013, paragraph 15). In concrete terms it means that if a country listed a specific 
measure in its Annex I reservations and later revised the measure in a more 
liberalising manner, it would then be unable to reintroduce the original measure. 
In accordance with the trade agreement such a change, essentially to the initial 
status, would be a modification of the measure, which would decrease the 
conformity of the measure. The measures listed in an Annex I can only be revised 
in accordance with trade agreement i.e. in a more liberalised way (Krajewski 
2013:9-11, 31). Essentially, the reservations made to protect public services will 
gradually disappear over time (Krajewski 2011:11) In the education sector, a 
possible scenario could be that a government in EU decides to privatise part of its 
education sector due to financial constraints following the entry into force of 
TTIP. As a result of that privatisation the government would have increased its 
level of commitments in TTIP and continuously be bound by this increased level 
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of privatisation. In the EC consultation on education services, it asks specifically 
to which other education services Member States have autonomously liberalised 
(EC Consultation to the Trade Policy Committee (Services and Investment) on 
education services 2014:3). In the context of the ratchet clause, the issue of 
autonomous liberalisations is highly important given that such autonomous 
liberalisations would be automatically locked in TTIP. The ratchet mechanism is 
displayed in the lower part of figure 5.1.  
 
In the Annex II existing and future measures inconsistent with the core 
obligations are listed. The future policy space depends on the reservations made in 
the Annex II. In the case, that no reservations are made in the Annex II, this 
would mean that the country is bound to keep the status quo (Krajewski 2013:11). 
As argued by Krajewski the ratchet clause is of particular importance for public 
services (Krajewski 2013:10). In particular, because public services have been 
subject to policy reforms in many EU Member States, where traditional public 
service sectors have been subjected to privatisation or marketisation. Such 
changes at the European level is also emphasised by Mörth, who demonstrates the 
remarkable changes that have taken place in the public utilities structure based on 
the conviction that the public sector ought to adopt a business-like model of 
operation (Mörth 2010:9-11). More broadly, public services are part of the 
constant policy contestation over the demarcation between public and private 
(Bexell - Mörth in Eds. Bexell - Mörth 2010:9-10), and consequently such a lock-
in would essentially freeze the possibility for continued contestation in this 
important policy field.  
 
The standstill mechanism requires that the level of liberalisation be locked in 
at the level set out in the FTA. GATS also contained a de facto standstill 
mechanism because commitments are vastly difficult to change. The GATS 
framework contains the requirement that such modifications must be accompanied 
by an offer of compensation to other GATS members (Fredriksson 2004:428-429, 
Scherrer 2005:487, 491, Woods - Narlikar 2001:572). The standstill mechanism is 
presented in the upper part of figure 5.1. Both the standstill and ratchet clause 
restrict very considerably the government’s decision-making powers. Essentially, 
the democratic decisions of a particular country are fixed according to the 
commitments previously undertaken, and even a new democratically elected 
government cannot change commitments made by its predecessors. The public 
policy space is accordingly confined to that of ever increasingly liberalisation. 
While, the de-facto standstill mechanism included in GATS implied a very 
considerable encroachment of the public policy space based on democratic 
decision-making, this encroachment is further intensified with the inclusion of the 
ratchet clause in TTIP. While stability and predictability may be desirable from a 
trade perspective, it comes at exceptionally high costs in terms of normative 
legitimacy, in particular in terms seen from the perspective of input legitimacy. 
Such cast-iron predictability appears problematic even from the standpoint of 
output legitimacy focusing on the effectiveness in promoting the common welfare 
of the constituency.  
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As this form of normative legitimacy focuses on the collective problem-solving 
capacity and performance, it is critical that there exists policy space to adjust to 
new development and changes of the constituency, however with the standstill 
and ratchet clauses such possibilities are substantially limited.       
 
It is suggested that the main economic benefits of TTIP will come through 
regulatory cooperation in the form of common rules, standards and procedure and 
in particular by reducing regulatory barriers to trade (DG Trade: About TTIP, DG 
Trade: The Regulatory Part, OECD TTIP: 3). According to an EC publication 
such gains would come from cutting red tape and having more coordination 
between regulators (DG Trade, The Regulatory Part 2013:2). The EU’s Directives 
for the TTIP negotiations says in this regards that TTIP “will aim at removing 
unnecessary obstacles to trade and investment, including NTBs, through effective 
and efficient mechanisms, by reaching an ambitious level of regulatory 
compatibility for goods and services, including through mutual recognition, 
harmonisation and through enhanced cooperation between regulators” 
(Council of the European Union, EU Directives for TTIP negotiations, 2013, 
paragraph 25, emphasis added). 
 
In the EC position paper on regulatory cooperation the methodology of such 
cooperation is explained rather detailed: “Upon a specific request of one Party the 
other Party should offer to enter into a dialogue, providing information on 
possible options and impacts, and react to written comments of the requesting 
Party. Parties shall explore possible concrete means to get to compatible 
outcomes or coordinated approaches, where appropriate, which achieve their 
respective regulatory objectives pursued, including the level of protection deemed 
appropriate on either side, while avoiding negative impacts on international and 
in particular transatlantic trade” (DG Trade: Position Paper – Chapter in 
Regulatory Coherence 2013:2). Furthermore, it is made clear that the transatlantic 
discussion on future legislation shall take place as early as possible and 
importantly these discussions shall take place before the adoption of the 
legislation (DG Trade: Position Paper – Chapter in Regulatory Coherence 
2013:3). Moreover, there is a proposal to establish a Regulatory Cooperation 
Council as part of the regulatory cooperation. Such a Council would bring 
together representatives of regulatory agencies in the EU and US in order to 
monitor the implementation of commitments made as well as to consider new 
priorities for regulatory cooperation including joint development of future 
regulations and early consultations on regulations (Council of the European 
Union, EU Directives for TTIP negotiations, 2013, paragraph 25, DG Trade: 
Position Paper – Chapter in Regulatory Coherence 2013, The Transatlantic 
Colossus 2014:86-88).  
 
This objective of “removing unnecessary obstacles to trade” is highly 
controversial as it implies the need to access whether a particular regulation is 
“unnecessary” or “more burdensome than necessary”. GATS (GATS art. VI:4) 
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also included the possibility to set up such regulatory disciplines. While none of 
these disciplines were included into GATS except for accountancy services 
(Krajewski 2011:14), GATS article VI:4b sets out that measures shall not be 
“more burdensome than necessary to ensure the quality of the service” (GATS 
VI:4b).  
 
The disciplines on domestic regulation are potentially reducing the 
government’s regulatory autonomy substantially. This is because the purpose of 
regulatory cooperation is to make sure that domestic regulations including 
licensing rules and technical standards are no more burdensome, i.e. no more 
trade restrictive than necessary (Krajewski 2011:14). Essentially, such regulatory 
coherence would require that governments, if challenged, would have to prove 
that their regulations are not more trade restrictive than necessary and that they 
are needed to achieve a specific public policy objective. In a trade agreement 
aiming at increasing liberalisations the threshold for what is considered necessary 
may be set at a very high level. Accordingly, in the case of Thailand – 
Restrictions on Importation of and Internal Taxes on Cigarettes, the WTO panel 
ruled considering the implication of “necessary” to mean that “there were no 
alternative measures consistent with the General Agreement or less inconsistent 
with it” (Thailand – Restrictions on Importation of and Internal Taxes on 
Cigarettes, DS 10/R-37S/200:§ 75). Despite the fact that the EU Directives also 
states that regulatory cooperation “shall be without prejudice to the right to 
regulate” (Council of the European Union, EU Directives for TTIP negotiations, 
2013, paragraph 25), it is nonetheless very controversial to include regulatory 
cooperation as such procedures implicate that the trading partner will be given at 
least some say concerning the regulations of its sovereign partner. Regulations are 
essentially the political choices of its community and achieved through 
democratic deliberation and decision-making. Moreover, regulations aim to 
achieve certain societal objectives, e.g. delivering nationwide universal quality 
education. However, regulatory coherence with its insistence on the necessity of 
the regulation may consider that those domestic regulations like universal service 
obligations could be too excessive to ensure the quality of the service (Krajewski 
2011:14). Especially, if the ruling in the WTO case referred above is to be applied 
to public services, including the education sector, with the requirement that there 
were no other alternative measure consistent or less inconsistent with TTIP, it 
would result in significant constraints on the liberty of action concerning domestic 
regulations. More generally, it would imply considerable constraints on the input 
side of political legitimacy with its focus on inclusion, participation, 
representation and deliberation to reflect the preferences of the community.  
 
Scharpf argues that output legitimacy can play a more important role in the 
absence of input legitimacy at the European level (Scharpf 1999:12,23,188). 
Consequently, if it can be argued that regulatory cooperation can effectively 
achieve the common welfare, it would be able to compensate for the lack of input 
legitimacy that such regulatory disciplines imply. Still, it is questionable that the 
common welfare of the EU and US will effortlessly coincide. Moreover, while 
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Scharpf argues that the political legitimacy is based on the two dimensions of 
respectively input- and output legitimacy, he simultaneously points out that such 
policies that interfere with profoundly held normative preferences would need 
particular resilient legitimating arguments (Scharpf 1996:6,12,23,188). As 
regulations goes to the heart of the sovereign state’s autonomous decision-making 
it would likely require very resilient arguments as to why the state should engage 
in regulatory cooperation that gives the other party the possibility to question the 
design and content of its regulation.  
 
Investment is the last element relating to the “new generation” FTAs of the 
EU being considered here. After the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty 
investment is part of the EU’s Common Commercial Policy, which is an exclusive 
EU competence (TFEU article 3(1)). Accordingly, investment is also included into 
the scope of TTIP. The aim in TTIP is to “negotiate investment liberalisation and 
protection provisions including areas of mixed competence, …, on the basis of the 
highest levels of liberalisation and highest standards of protection that both 
Parties have negotiated to date.”(Council of the European Union, EU Directives 
for TTIP negotiations, 2013, paragraph 22).  
 
Investment protection is one of the main controversies in TTIP, in particular 
the possible inclusion of the investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) mechanism. 
Following the huge amount of criticisms to include ISDS into TTIP the EC 
launched a public consultation on the issue on the 27 March 2014. The public 
consultation was closed on 13 July 2014. However, the EC does not expect that 
the analysis of the public consultation will be finalised before November 2014 as 
it received the unprecedented number of submission of 150.000 (DG Trade, 
Primary Report: Online Public Consultation on ISDS in TTIP:1,5). The EC argues 
for the inclusion of ISDS in TTIP by pointing out that EU Member States already 
are party to approximately 1400 international investment agreements (IIA) and 
that nine Member States also have bilateral investment treaties (BITs) with the US 
(DG Trade, Questions and Answers, Why is the EU including Investor to State 
Dispute Settlement in TTIP). However, all of these EU Member States that have 
BITs with the US concluded them before their accession to the EU (EPC Policy 
Brief 2014:2). Moreover, the inclusion of ISDS in TTIP would mean an extensive 
expansion of ISDS. Currently, the BITs in place between EU Member States and 
the US cover as little as 1% of US foreign direct investment (FDI) stock and 0.1% 
of the EU FDI stock in the EU (UNCTAD IIA issues note 2014:1). ISDS is so 
controversial because foreign investors through ISDS provisions are enabled to 
sue the host state based on before arbitration panels, established under the aegis of 
arbitration centres such as the International Centre for the Settlement of 
Investment Disputes (ICSID) (The Transatlantic Colossus 2014:76-79). An 
investor can make claims under ISDS based on perceived violations of rights 
given to the investor, such as protection against discrimination, direct and indirect 
expropriation, and unfair and inequitable treatment (EPC Policy Brief 2014:1).  
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The contrast between ISDS arbitration on the one hand and international human 
rights law is striking. In the latter there is no mechanism to force the government 
to meet its commitments to for example ensuring the child’s right to education, 
but the only instrument available is to make suggestions and general 
recommendations to the government (Frederiksson 2004:429), while under ISDS 
a private company can by the use of ISDS eventually force the government to pay 
huge amounts in compensation based on the alleged deprivation of market access 
following e.g. the tightening of quality standards to be fulfilled in order to provide 
education services. Moreover, ISDS gives exclusive rights to foreign investors 
that are not available to domestic investors or citizens. In particular, foreign 
investors do not need to exhaust the domestic court system, before taking its case 
to ISDS.  
 
In addition, there are concerns that the vast cost of defending ISDS cases, 
which on average is $8 million, as well as the very high amounts of ISDS awards, 
may deter governments from pursuing future policy goals or taking regulatory 
measures that may have an impact on foreign investors and it therefore will result 
in a regulatory chill effect. In order to assess the possible consequences for the 
education sector it is particularly relevant to consider that the education sector is a 
highly regulated sector consisting of quality assurance requirements and licensing 
requirement. Considering ISDS cases of the past where investors were awarded 
tremendous amounts based on very limited or no real investment, it makes such 
possible challenges in the case of the education sector all the more problematic. 
This can be illustrated by the Al-Kharafi versus Libya case, where the investor 
was awarded $935 million in lost profits based on an investment of $5 million 
(EPC Policy Brief 2014:2).  
 
As demonstrated by Van Harten in the analysis of 140 known cases under 
investment treaties until May 2010, there have been a strong tendency towards 
expansive rulings in previous ISDS arbitration, which enhanced the compensatory 
awards to investors and, in turn, the risk of liability for respondent states (Van 
Harten 2012:214,251). The possible inclusion of ISDS in TTIP could therefore 
have critical implications on the education sector. ISDS would expose Member 
States and education systems to private sector initiated legal disputes. With ISDS 
private education providers would be given new legal rights to challenge 
ambiguities and inconsistencies in the application of TTIP rules, and consequently 
the likelihood of claims against Member States for alleged infractions of such 
disciplines are expected to rise. As demonstrated by Van Harten’s study there is a 
strong tendency towards expansive rulings in ISDS arbitration, which results in 
greater risk of liability for sovereign states (Van Harten 2012:214,251), and 
therefore a costly affair for states. The difference between ISDS arbitration and 
WTO’s dispute settlement procedure is significant. In contrast to ISDS, the WTO 
dispute settlement requires that a WTO member take action and demand that the 
other WTO member fulfill its obligations. The case can only be referred to the 
WTO’s settlement mechanism after the other WTO member has had the 
possibility give its answer to the complaint. As pointed out by Scherrer there have 
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only been very few cases of dispute settlement under GATS and of those only two 
went to the formation of a dispute panel. Also, there has been no single case based 
on education (Scherrer 2005:488). It is arguably the case that the member-to-
member dispute settlement process built into the WTO agreements, including 
GATS, prevents many frivolous or vexatious cases. Furthermore, it has been 
speculated that the lack of any dispute over the interpretation of GATS article I.3 
may be due to the perceived self-interest in all states of protecting their own 
regulatory space. However, the self-interest of individual investor would not bar 
ISDS cases concerning the state’s regulatory competences, rather the opposite as 
cases from particular developing countries have demonstrated.    
 
In summery, while the commitments on privately funded education services 
give rise to uncertainty concerning what will be understood to constitute public 
education, the new disciplines and rules of the TTIP significantly deepen and 
extend those commitments and therefore taken together exposes the education 
sector to serious risks. More broadly, taking together these elements of the “new 
generation” FTAs they constitute very substantial constraints on the autonomous 
decision-making of the sovereign state. Such constraints are of particular 
importance in the case of the education sector as it is a highly regulated sector.  
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6 Conclusions  
The objective of this thesis has been to examine the potential consequences of 
including the education sector into a future TTIP agreement. The analysis found 
that serious consequences in terms of marketisation and privatisation could be the 
result of including education into TTIP based on two circumstances.  
 
Firstly, the level of commitments on education is fundamental to the possible 
risks posed to the education sector. The EU’s commitments follow the EU’s 
approach to education since the GATS, which is to include privately funded 
education services. At first sight this seems a rather good approach and seems to 
indicate that public education would not be assigned to perform pursuant to the 
trade regime. Nevertheless, the safeguards to the public education sector based on 
this approach is actually limited due to the lack of definitions of what constitutes 
respectively privately funded education and publicly funded education. The 
resulting uncertainty may be further challenged due to recent reforms at the 
national level introducing elements of “competitiveness” in the public sector 
including education. Even in the improved and more qualified version included in 
the EU’s initial services and investment offer (EU’s TTIP initial offer on trade in 
services and investment 2014:21) the problems are not evaded, as this criterion 
would not apply to the agreement in its integrity. Furthermore, the analysis has 
shown that there is a silent erosion of the limitation taken by individual EU 
Member States. While the Member States in GATS included limitations across 
different modes of supply, in the TTIP offer on services such limitations apply 
mainly to the commercial presence and presence of natural persons. This 
demonstrates the process of gradual but increasing commitments in the education 
sector.  
 
Secondly, TTIP intends to include new disciplines and rules with the aim of 
increasing the level of liberations.  In particular, it concerns the ratchet and 
standstill clause, the regulatory cooperation and finally the ISDS mechanism. 
Taken together these new elements are deepening and extending the commitments 
made in the education sector with potentially serious consequences. It is the case 
that such rules and disciplines are not particularly intended for the education 
sector, but applies horizontally to all issue areas to be covered by TTIP. The very 
unique characteristics of education explain why its inclusion under such rules is 
very unfortunate. Firstly, education plays an essential role for the fulfilment of the 
social rights of citizenship. Accordingly, the full realisation of social rights 
requires universally provided education. Education also plays an important role in 
structuring national identity. Secondly, education works as an influential 
determent of (in)equality ex ante. Moreover, with the appearance of the 
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‘knowledge’ economy and the enhanced significance of human capital, education 
is becoming increasingly important. US companies hold a strong position in the 
field of education services, which is apparent from the growing export and surplus 
of these services since the 1990s. It can be argued that the US advantage in 
education services can be explained by the already relatively high percentage of 
private funded education services, especially in the area of tertiary education. 
Also, it is no coincidence that the US is particularly interested in including adult 
and other education services in the context of TTIP and similar trade negotiations, 
as the potential future profits in these areas of education are likely to be very 
substantially based on the need for continuous education and training and lifelong 
learning.  
 
However, markets have proved to be inefficient in providing universal 
education and result in market failures based on asymmetrical information 
concerning its quality. The framework of normative legitimacy gives insight into 
how public organisations and private companies pursue distinct forms of 
legitimacy with important consequences for the provision of universal quality 
education. It is particularly critical in this respect that the private for-profit firm is 
“situated in a world of their own” (Svedberg Helgesson in Eds. Bexell – Mörth 
2010:27). In concrete terms it implies that private for-profit businesses pursue the 
profit-seeking behaviour focusing on economic value. As a result, the private 
companies follow a limited kind of accountability compared to the accountability 
mechanism of public organisations based on democratic accountability standards. 
Accountability standards of private for-profit companies focus on the economic 
values of reaping profits and such accountability is directed towards the 
shareholders and investors of the private companies rather than to the broad 
publics affected by the activities of these companies. As business activity focuses 
on the profitable market segments this implies that when applied to the education 
sector the market mechanisms will result in inadequate provision of universal 
quality education. Moreover, there is the issue of how the principal i.e. the CEO is 
controlled in the case of for-profit companies. The example of for-profit schools 
in the US shows some clear unbalances based on the extraordinary high amounts 
that were rewarded to the CEOs. When combined with rather low levels of 
expenditure towards the actual teaching and training of students, such extravagant 
rewards of CEOs becomes very problematic and shows how for-profit companies 
are not the effective and efficient actors they are sometimes assumed to be.  
 
In contrast, the accountability standards for public organisations are markedly 
different with the emphasis on democratic accountability based on democratic 
procedural characteristics and the importance of input legitimacy. Consequently, 
with the marketisation and privatisation of education this results in a distinct kind 
of accountability, which focuses on economic values rather than democratic 
procedures and equity that public organisations are directed by. In the case of 
MNCs, the accountability discrepancy is particularly pronounced based on these 
companies’ significant economic power, which translate into substantial political 
influence. Nevertheless, MNCs are not democratically accountability for their 
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activities and as a result there is an accountability gap regarding the activities of 
MNCs. While it is beyond this scope of this thesis to solve the lack of democratic 
accountability for for-profit companies in general and MNCs in particular, this is 
an important area to consider for further research.   
 
This study is constrained in the way that the material underlying the analysis is 
mainly based on EC sources, however it attempts to engage as much as possible 
with the US side of the TTIP coin. However, it is obvious that in order to succeed 
in showing the complete picture it would have been valuable to have more insight 
into the US’ position, goals and possible sensitivities in the area of education. 
Nevertheless, despite this limitation it is still worthwhile to evaluate how 
education may be affected in crucial ways by TTIP at this still rather early stage 
of the negotiations.     
  47 
7 References 
Adlung, Rudolf – Mattoo, Aaditya, 2008. “The Basic Economics of Services 
Trade” in Mattoo, Aaditya – Stern, Robert M. – Zanini, Gianni (eds.). A 
Handbook of International Trade In Services. Oxford University Press.  
Bexell, Magdalena – Mörth (eds.), 2010. Democracy and Public-Private 
Partnerships in Global Governance. Palgrave Macmillan.  
Bresser-Pereira, Luiz Carlos, 2004. Democracy and Public Management Reform–
Building the Republican State. Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
Buckler, Steve, 2002, “Normative Theory” in Marsh, David – Stoker, Gerry, 
2002. Theory and Methods in Political Science. Second Edition. Palgrave 
Macmillan. 
Busemeyer, Marius R. – Nikolai, Rita, 2010. “Education” in Castles, Francis G. – 
Leibfried, Stephan – Lewis, Jane – Obinger, Herbert – Pierson, Christopher 
(eds.), 2010. The Oxford Handbook of The Welfare State. Oxford University 
Press  
Cardoso, Daniel – Mthembu, Philani – Venhaus, Marc - Verde Garrido , 
Miguelángel (eds.), 2014. ”The Transatlantic Colossus: Global Contributions 
to Broaden the Debate on the EU-US Free Trade Agreement”, 
http://www.collaboratory.de/images/archive/8/8d/20140118121833!TheTrans
atlanticColossus.pdf  [2014-02-10]. 
Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR), 2013. “Reducing Transatlantic 
Barriers to Trade and Investment: An Economic Assessment”. 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2013/march/tradoc_150737.pdf, [2014-
03-02]. 
Colas, Bernard – Gottlieb, Richard, October 2011. “Legal Opinion – GATS 
Impact on Education in Canada”, Gottlieb & Pearson, 
http://archive.caut.ca/uploads/GATSImpact.pdf,  [2014-05-17].  
Copeland, Brian – Mattoo, Aaditya, 2008. “The GATS” in Mattoo, Aaditya – 
Stern, Robert M. – Zanini, Gianni (eds.). A Handbook of International Trade 
In Services. Oxford University Press 
Council of the European Union, EU Directives for the TTIP negotiations, 17 June 
2013. The Directives for TTIP negotiations have not been officially published 
by EC, but is available on various webpages including http://eu-
secretdeals.info/upload/TTIP-mandate_M-Schaake_website.pdf, [2014-09-
05].       
DG Trade, About TTIP, http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/in-focus/ttip/about-ttip/,  
[2014-03-02]. 
DG Trade, EU-US trade – 7th round of talks on transatlantic trade pact ends in the 
US, http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=1158, [2014-10-03].      
  48 
DG Trade, Protecting public services in TTIP and other EU trade agreements, 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=1115, [2014-08-20].     
DG Trade, 2013.”The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership: The 
Regulatory Part”. 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2013/july/tradoc_151605.pdf,  [2014-03-
02]. 
DG Trade, 2013. “TTIP: Cross-cutting Disciplines and Institutional Provisions 
Position Paper – Chapter on Regulatory Coherence”, The Position Paper has 
not been officially published by the EC, but is available at 
http://corporateeurope.org/sites/default/files/ttip-regulatory-coherence-2-12-
2013.pdf, [2014-03-02].   
DG Trade, Questions and Answers, Why is the EU including Investor to State 
Dispute Settlement in the TTIP?, http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/in-
focus/ttip/questions-and-answers/, [2014-10-05].       
EPC Policy Brief, 2014, “ISDS and TTIP – A miracle cure for a systematic 
challenge?”, http://www.epc.eu/documents/uploads/pub_4637_isds_&_ttip_-
_a_miracle_cure_for_a_systemic_challenge.pdf, [2014-08-20].      
ESA Issue Brief #01-11, U.S. Trade in Private Services, U.S. Department of 
Commerce, Economics and Statistics Administration. 
http://www.esa.doc.gov/sites/default/files/reports/documents/esaissuebriefno1.
pdf, [2014-05-11].  
Europe 2020, http://ec.europa.eu/europe2020/index_en.htm, [2014-03-02].      
European Commission Consultation to the Trade Policy Committee (Services and 
Investment) on education services, 2014. Education services: consultation 
TPC SI. The Consultation has not been officially published by EC, on file 
with author.  
European Commission, 2014. TTIP draft offer on services and investment, 
Trade/B1/SJ/lj 1803315, 26 May 2014, the draft offer has not been officially 
published by EC, on file with the author.  
European Commission, 2014. TTIP initial offer on trade in services and 
investment, schedule of specific commitments and reservations, 30 June 2014, 
the offer has not been officially published by EC, on file with the author.  
European Commission, 2014. ”Preliminary Report (statistical overview) Online 
public consultation on investment protection and investor-to-state dispute 
settlement (ISDS) in the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership 
(TTIP)”. http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2014/july/tradoc_152693.pdf, 
[2014-08-20].    
European Commission - SPEECH/13/544   17/06/2013. ”Statement by President 
Barroso on the EU-US trade agreement with U.S. President Barack Obama, 
the President of the European Council Herman Van Rompuy and UK Prime 
Minister David Cameron”. http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-13-
544_en.htm,  [2014-03-02]. 
European Commission, 2014. “State of Play of TTIP negotiations after the 6th 
round”, http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2014/july/tradoc_152699.pdf, 
[2014-09-28].  
  49 
European Commission, 2011, “Reflection Paper on Services of General Interest in 
Bilateral FTAs (Applicable to both Positive and Negative Lists)”, 28 February 
2011, The Reflections Paper has not been officially published by EC, but is 
available at http://www.s2bnetwork.org/themes/eus-trade-strategy/eu-
documents.html, [2014-08-20].     
Fogarty, Edward A., 2004. “Be Careful What You Wish For: The European Union 
and North America” in Aggarwal, Vinod K. – Fogarty, Edward A. (eds.). EU 
Trade Strategies Between Regionalism and Globalism. Palgrave Macmillan. 
”For Profit Higher Education: The Failure to Safeguard the Federal Investment 
and Ensure Student Success”, 2012. US Senate’s Health, Education, Labour 
and Pensions Committee, 
http://www.help.senate.gov/imo/media/for_profit_report/PartI-PartIII-
SelectedAppendixes.pdf [2014-05-27].  
Fridriksson, Ulf, 2004. “Studying the Supra-National in Education: GATS, 
education and teacher union policies,” European Educational Research 
Journal, Vol. 3, No. 2, 415-441.  
Fuchs, Doris – Kalfagianni, Agni – Sattelberger, Julia, 2010. “Democratic 
Legitimacy of Transnational Corporations in Global Governance” in Erman, 
Eva – Uhlin, Anders (eds). Legitimacy Beyond the State? Re-examining the 
Democratic Credentials of Transnational Actors. Palgrave Macmillan.  
GATS, http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/26-gats.pdf, [2014-05-17].  
George, Alexander L. – Bennett, Andrew, 2005. Case Studies and Theory 
Development in the Social Sciences. Cambridge: MIT Press.  
“Global Europe: Competing In The World”, Communication from the 
Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the European Economic 
and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, COM(2006) 567 
final, http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2006:0567:FIN:EN:PDF, 
[2014-03-02].     
Grant, Ruth W. – Keohane, Robert O., 2005. “Accountability and Abuses of 
Power in World Politics,” American Political Science Review, Vol. 99- No. 1, 
29-43.  
Inside U.S. Trade, “De Gucht Says TTIP Likely To Enter Into Cross-Sector Trade 
Offs Next Year”, 2014-09-12, Vol. 32, No. 36.   
Inside U.S. Trade, “U.S. Official Signals Dissatisfaction With EU Services 
Offer’s Format, Scope”, 2014-07-25, Vol. 32, No. 30.  
Keohane, Robert O., 2005. “Abuse of Power – Assessing Accountability in World 
Politics,” Harvard International Review, Summer, 48-53.  
Keohane, Robert O., 2006. “Accountability in World Politics,” Scandinavian 
Political Studies, Vol. 29 – No. 2, 75-87.  
Krajewski, Markus, 2011, “Public services in bilateral free trade agreements of 
the EU”, Social Science Research Network, 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1964288, [2014-05-12].   
Krajewski, Markus, 2013. “Public Services in EU Trade and Investment 
Agreement - The politics of Globalization and public services: putting EU’s 
trade and investment agenda in its place”, draft version for meeting on 14 
  50 
November 2013, 
http://www.epsu.org/IMG/pdf/Draft_report_Markus_Krajewski_mtg14Nov20
13.pdf [2014-05-12].  
Marshall, Thomas H., 1964. Class, Citizenship and Social Development. Garden 
City, NY:Doubleday.  
Mattoo, Aaditya – Stern, Robert M., 2008. “Overview” in Mattoo, Aaditya – 
Stern, Robert M. – Zanini, Gianni (eds.). A Handbook of International Trade 
In Services. Oxford University Press 
Oakerson, Ronald J., 1989. “Governance Structures for Enhancing Accountability 
and Responsiveness” in Handbook of Public Administration, ed. Perry, James 
L. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.   
OECD (2013), “Education at a Glance 2013: OECD Indicators”, OECD 
Publishing. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/eag-2013-en, [2014-05-02]. 
OECD (2013), “Education at a Glance 2013: OECD Indicators”, OECD 
Publishing, Expenditure on educational institutions as a percentage of GDP, 
by source of fund and level of education (2010) 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932849616, [2014-05-02]. 
OECD (2013), “THE TRANSATLANTIC TRADE AND INVESTMENT 
PARTNERSHIP: WHY DOES IT MATTER?” 
http://www.oecd.org/trade/TTIP.pdf [2014-05-02]. 
Perrow, Charles, 1986. Complex Organizations: A Critical Essay. Third edition. 
New York: McGraw-Hill. 
Robertson, Susan L. – Bonal, Xavier – Dale, Roger, 2006. “GATS and the 
Education Service Industry: The Politics of Scale and Global 
Reterritorialization” in Lauder, Hugh – Brown, Philip – Dillabough, Jo-Anne 
– Halsey, A. H. (eds.). Education, Globalization and Social Change. Oxford 
University Press  
Ross, Stephen A., 1973. “The Economic Theory of Agency: The Principal’s 
Problem,” American Economic Review, 63: 134–9. 
Scharpf, Fritz, 1999. Governing in Europe: Effective and Democratic? Oxford: 
Oxford University Press.  
Scharpf, Fritz, 2006. “Problem Solving Effectiveness and Democratic 
Accountability in the EU”, IHS Political Science Series, No. 107. 
Scherrer, Christoph, 2005. “GATS: long-term strategy for the commodification of 
education”, Review of International Political Economy, 12:3, 484-510.  
Schäferhoff, Marco - Campe, Sabine – Kaan, Christopher, 2009. “Transnational 
Public-Private Partnerships in International Relations: Making Sense of 
Concepts, Research Frameworks and Results”, International Studies Review, 
11: 451–74. 
Social Europe Journal, Baker, Dean, “TTIP: It’s Not About Trade!”, 2014-02-13, 
http://www.social-europe.eu/2014/02/ttip/, [2014-03-02].   
Stiglitz, Joseph E., 2012. The Price of Inequality: How Today’s Divided Society 
Endangers Our Future. W. W. Norton and Company.   
  51 
Thailand – Restictions on Importation of and Internal Taxes on Cigarettes, 
DS10/R-37S/200, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/90cigart.pdf 
[2014-07-27]. 
TFEU, Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union, 2008 O.J. C 115/47.  
UNCTAD, 2014, IIA Issues Note “Investor-State Dispute Settlement: An 
information Note on the United States and the European Union”, No.2, July 
2014, http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/webdiaepcb2014d4_en.pdf, 
[2014-08-20].       
UNESCO (2000) World Education Report. Paris: UNESCO.  
Vaillancourt Rosenau, Pauline, 2000. “The Strengths and Weaknesses of Public-
Private Policy Partnerships” in Vaillancourt Rosenau, Pauline (ed.). Public 
Private Policy Partnerships. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press. 
Van Harten, Gus, 2012, “Arbitrator Behaviour in Asymmetrical Adjudication: An 
Empirical Study of Investment Treaty Arbitration”, Osgoode Hall Law 
Journal, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2149207, [2014-
10-05].   
Vienna Convention on the law of treaties, 1969, 
https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%201155/volume-1155-
I-18232-English.pdf, [2014-05-17].   
Woods, Ngaire – Narlikar, Amrita, 2001. “Governance and the Limits of 
Accountability: The WTO, the IMF and the World Bank”, International 
Social Science Journal, 170, 569-83.  
WTO Communication from the European Communities and its Member States, 
Draft consolidated GATS Schedule, 9 October 2006, S/C/W/273 2006, this is 
the consolidated schedule that covers 25 Member States, which was certified 
on 18 December 2006. However, this schedule has not yet entered into force, 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2012/november/tradoc_150087.pdf, 
[2014-09-28].   
WTO Education Services, Background Note by the Secretariat, Council for Trade 
in Services, 29 September 1998, S/C/W/49, 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/serv_e/w49.doc, [2014-07-27].  
Zelizer, Viviana A., 2005. The Purchase of Intimacy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press. 
